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FOREWORD
One of the most complex challenges facing the
United States and its allies today is how to deal with an
increasingly bold and aggressive Russia. As evidenced
by its invasion of Ukraine, annexation of Crimea, and
unremitting influence operations against the West,
Russia has engaged in an antagonistic foreign policy
campaign that has both challenged and befuddled the
United States and its allies. How should the United
States respond? What measures can it take without
igniting a major conflict? These are some of the difficult questions that the authors, active duty military
officers, and national security fellows from the John F.
Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
address in this timely and prescient monograph. They
offer an audacious perspective on how the United
States should deal with Russia in this unconventional
battlespace referred to by scholars today as the “gray
zone,” or the conceptual space between war and peace
where nations compete to advance their national interests. The authors argue that a more holistic strategy,
one that relies less on conventional military might
and more on the full array of instruments of national
power, is necessary to more effectively operate in the
gray zone. Specifically, they offer and expound upon
myriad policy recommendations across the diplomacy,
information, military, and economic (DIME) model,
providing U.S. policymakers with a range of options

ix

to confront and deter Russia while protecting vital U.S.
national security interests.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
This monograph argues that the United States lacks
a cohesive strategy to deter Russian aggression in the
“gray zone.”
RESEARCH FINDINGS
First, subject matter experts from across the diplomacy, information, military, and economic (DIME)
spectrum acknowledge that the United States lacks a
strategy to deal with Russia in the gray zone.
Second, the gray zone encompasses those areas
of state competition where antagonistic actions take
place; however, those actions fall short of the red lines
that would normally result in armed conflict between
nations. The lines between war and peace in the gray
zone are blurred, and competition occurs across all
instruments of national power. By leveraging a creative strategy and hybrid tactics, Russia attempts to
achieve its strategic objectives without compelling the
United States to respond using military force. Examples of gray zone tactics include cyberattacks, information operations and propaganda, deception, sabotage,
proxy war, assassinations, espionage, economic coercion, violations of international law, and terrorism.1
Third, some of the unique challenges when dealing
with Russia in the gray zone include:
• Strategic culture: Unlike many of its adversaries, the United States largely continues to
conceptualize conflict through the traditional
black-and-white model of war and peace, fixating on conventional military warfare, while
marginalizing the other critical instruments of
national power.2
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• Organizational seams: Organizational seams
between departments and agencies make it difficult to address challenges that are multifaceted and simultaneously political and military
in nature.3
• Gray zone detection: Attacks in the gray zone
are difficult to defend against and usually hard
to detect because they are often hidden, undeclared, and ambiguous.4
• Ethical dilemmas: Gray zone actors often
employ unconventional tactics that arguably
skirt ethical boundaries; therefore, the use of
such methods by the U.S. Government could
have a detrimental effect and clash with American values.
• Legal constraints: International and domestic laws limit options available to policymakers and often do not clearly address acceptable
norms when operating throughout the gray
zone. Countering Russian misinformation and
propaganda presents unique public and private sector challenges with respect to the First
Amendment.
Fourth, U.S. policymakers face an action versus
inaction conundrum when countering Russia in the
gray zone. When faced with this conundrum, the
United States must wholly assess the alleged axiom
that action and inaction are equally unpalatable.5 On
the one hand, if the United States takes no action, its
political system, credibility, and influence, among
other things, will unquestionably remain under constant subversive attack. On the other hand, if the
United States does act, it potentially risks major escalation through strategic miscalculation. In other words,

xvi

the wrong action or too much action could potentially
result in unintended consequences that are fundamentally more severe than simply staying the course and
maintaining the status quo. To date, the United States
has fallen victim to this paralysis.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In order to deter Russian activity in the gray zone,
the United States must shift its strategic framework
from a predominantly military-centric model to one
that comprises a whole-of-government approach. A
whole-of-government approach requires the simultaneous application of various DIME measures.
Diplomacy
The United States must renew open dialogue and
initiate negotiations with Russia to find areas of overlapping interests or common ground. While the United
States cannot revert to the level of cooperation reached
before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it must find ways
to restore diplomatic and military lines of communication to a more significant level than currently is in
place.
Policy Proposals
• Reset U.S.-Russia diplomatic staffing to pre2016 sanction levels.
• Promote cooperation and diplomatic engagement via the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forums such as the NATO Russia
Council.
• Renew the U.S.-Russia military-to-military
relationship.
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• Lift National Defense Authorization Act
restrictions.
• Explore opportunities for cybersecurity initiatives with Russia.
• Collaborate with Russia on a short- and longterm strategy in Syria.
• Work together to pursue global nonproliferation and nuclear security initiatives.
• Negotiate a 5-year extension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START).
• Continue cooperation in multinational space
exploration efforts.
Information
The United States must detect and counter Russian
misinformation operations both at home and abroad.
In order to achieve this goal, the United States must
institute policy changes that tilt the information environment in its favor. The State Department has the requisite skill set to accomplish this but requires proper
staffing and resourcing to counter Russian misinformation campaigns overseas. The United States must
work in concert with NATO to support new initiatives
in counter-hybrid warfare and strategic communications. Employing covert action in concert with the
other elements of national power is also paramount.
At home, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
should consider developing an organization to detect
and monitor Russian gray zone threats against the
United States. Further, Congress must develop legislation that regulates Internet platforms and increases
transparency. Lastly, the President must use the bully
pulpit to demonstrate U.S. resolve by denouncing Russian gray zone actions.
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Policy Proposals
• Establish an Office of Foreign Influence in the
DHS:
• Detect and monitor gray zone activity.
• Draft congressional legislation to:
• Combat
online
misinformation
and
propaganda;
• Restrict use of foreign-generated bots and
trolls; and,
• Build transparency in online political ads.
• Build resiliency via Presidential actions:
• Denounce Russian activities publicly.
• Fully resource and fund the State Department’s
Global Engagement Center (GEC):
• Enable partners to counter propaganda and
misinformation.
• Support NATO and European initiatives:
• Counter-hybrid warfare operations; and,
• Strategic communications and messaging.
• Employ covert action:
• Undercut Russia’s active measures;
• Expose human rights violations;
• Delegitimize the Russian Government; and,
• Embarrass Russian President Vladimir Putin
and his inner circle.
Military
U.S. military hegemony and the threat of U.S. military action remain powerful tools in the international
arena. The United States must continue to leverage its
superior military capability in combination with the
other instruments of national power to deter Russia
in the gray zone while avoiding escalation into major
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conflict. The deterrence model’s focus should shift
from one of punishment to denial. Moreover, the
United States must focus its military efforts on revitalizing NATO and improving its warfighting capability
in Europe.
Policy Proposals
• Build a strategy based on deterrence by denial.
• Compel NATO partners to meet Article 3 guidelines to modernize their forces.
• Improve NATO rapid response capability.
• Reexamine Article 5 to address hybrid warfare
and gray zone tactics.
• Expand the enhanced forward presence (EFP)
to at least seven allied brigades.
• Invest in advanced weapons and aircraft to
counter the Kaliningrad anti-access/area denial
(A2/AD) threat.
• Increase the U.S. military footprint in Europe.
• Increase Alliance presence in the waters and
airspace around Russia.
• Maintain bases and installations to support
logistics.
• Develop regional indigenous capacity.
• Explore friendly A2/AD capabilities.
Economic
The United States must explore the full gamut of
economic options to target Russia’s wealth and prosperity. By collaborating with the European Union
(EU), it should finalize a bilateral trade agreement
that not only bolsters the economies of its allies but
also weakens Russia’s capacity for economic coercion.
Coupled with economic assistance to former Soviet
xx

bloc countries, the United States should help stabilize fragile European economies while strengthening
its national security partnerships. Moreover, it must
employ a blend of economic and financial sanctions
to keep Russia at bay. Finally, the United States can
further protect Europe’s energy security by reducing
European dependence on Russian energy supplies.
Policy Proposals
• Complete the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) proposal with additional provisions, including:
• Joint responses to Russian economic coercion and global market abuses;
• Reapplication of the most effective elements
of current U.S.-EU sanctions;
• An energy chapter that outlines preemptive
safeguards and responses to future attempts
at pipeline politics; and,
• A plan to reduce Europe’s dependence on
Russian oil and natural gas by increasing
exports of U.S. oil and natural gas to Europe.
• Overhaul the U.S. foreign aid program by:
• Restoring the State Department and foreign
aid budgets to pre-2018 President’s budget
proposal levels;
• Increasing Official Development Assistance
(ODA) foreign aid funding from 0.17 percent to at least 0.7 percent of gross national
income (GNI); and,
• Increasing aid to Eastern European countries
in order to bolster their economies and make
them less susceptible to Russian influence.
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• Formulate economic and financial sanctions by:
• Continuing 2014 and 2017 sanctions in force;
• Employing additional multilateral sanctions
in coordination with the EU;
• Restricting or limiting access to U.S. markets;
• Targeting Russian banks and financial institutions; and,
• Targeting Russian elites and oligarchs by
freezing their assets and destroying their
wealth.
• Reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian gas
supplies by:
• Creating incentives for the American private
sector to ship liquefied natural gas (LNG) to
Europe;
• Encouraging European allies to drill for
shale gas of their own; and,
• Collaborating with their EU counterparts to
develop an energy security strategy.
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CHAPTER 1. THE GRAY ZONE
By failing to understand that the space between war and
peace is not an empty one—but a landscape churning
with political, economic, and security competitions—
American foreign policy risks being reduced to a reactive
and tactical emphasis on the military instrument.1
—Dr. Nadia Schadlow, National Security Strategist

A WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT APPROACH: THE
DIPLOMACY, INFORMATION, MILITARY, AND
ECONOMIC (DIME) APPARATUS
The United States lacks a cohesive strategy to deter
Russian aggression in the “gray zone.” The gray zone
refers to the conceptual space between peace and war
where nations use a hybrid combination of conventional and unconventional actions to achieve national
objectives.2 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union,
the United States has enjoyed a unique position as
the world’s sole military superpower. Consequently,
adversary nations like Russia have been reluctant to
challenge the United States directly in conventional
warfare.3 Recognizing its immense military disadvantage, Russia has turned to the gray zone to launch a
total war against the United States and its allies. This
innovative form of warfare takes place “across all
fronts—political, informational, economic, cyber—
simultaneously through fear and intimidation without
launching a large-scale military attack.”4 By leveraging
this creative strategy, Russia believes it can achieve
its strategic objectives without compelling the United
States to respond using military force.5
In order to deter Russian activity in the gray zone,
the United States must shift its strategic framework
from a predominantly military-centric model to one
1

that comprises a whole-of-government approach.
Unlike conventional warfare, the employment of military force alone is not a viable strategy, especially
since gray zone conflicts are “designed, almost by definition, to circumvent traditional U.S. military power.”6
Thus, the United States must employ all instruments
of national power. Using the DIME framework, this
monograph offers U.S. policymakers a starting point
for developing a whole-of-government strategy to
deter Russia in the gray zone.
Diplomacy
The United States must renew open dialogue
and initiate negotiations with Russia to find areas of
common ground. Common ground exists between
two cooperating nations that have similar or overlapping interests. While the United States cannot revert
to the level of cooperation reached before Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine, it must find ways to restore diplomatic and military lines of communication to a more
significant level than currently is in place.
Information
The United States must detect and counter Russian influence operations both at home and abroad.
In order to achieve this goal, the United States must
institute policy changes that tilt the information environment in its favor. The U.S. Department of State has
the requisite skill set to accomplish this but requires
proper staffing and resourcing to counter Russian misinformation campaigns overseas. The United States
must work in concert with the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) to support new initiatives in
counter-hybrid warfare and strategic communications.
2

Employing covert action in concert with the other elements of national power is also paramount. At home,
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should
consider developing an organization to detect and
monitor Russian gray zone threats against the United
States. Further, Congress must develop legislation that
regulates Internet platforms and increases transparency. Lastly, the President must use the bully pulpit to
demonstrate the U.S. resolve by denouncing Russian
gray zone actions.
Military
U.S. military hegemony and the threat of U.S.
military action remain powerful tools in the international arena. The United States must leverage its
superior military capability in combination with the
other instruments of national power to deter Russia
in the gray zone while avoiding escalation into major
conflict or war. The deterrence model’s focus should
shift from one of punishment to denial. Therefore,
the United States must focus its military efforts on
the NATO revitalization, force footprint and strategic
positioning, and a coercion-deterrence dynamic.
Economic
The United States must explore the full gamut of
economic options to target Russia’s wealth and prosperity. Economic and financial sanctions are powerful
tools for influencing behavior and punishing Russia
for its belligerence in the gray zone. Moreover, the
United States must collaborate with the European
Union (EU) to finalize a bilateral trade agreement
that not only bolsters the economies of its allies but
also weakens Russia’s capacity for economic coercion.
3

Coupled with economic assistance to former Soviet
bloc countries, the United States should help stabilize fragile European economies while strengthening
its national security partnerships. Finally, the United
States can further protect the EU’s energy security by
reducing European dependence on Russian energy
supplies.
A whole-of-government approach requires the
simultaneous application of various DIME measures.
The DIME apparatus acts like an interdependent
system, where each lever (see figure 1-1) represents an
instrument of national power. All four levers are constantly in motion and have strong interrelationships.
However, each lever’s intensity varies according to
the action or response necessary to achieve desired
objectives vis-à-vis the gray zone.

Figure 1-1. The DIME Apparatus7
UNDERSTANDING THE GRAY ZONE
The gray zone encompasses those areas of state
competition where antagonist actions take place; however, those actions fall short of the red lines that would
4

normally result in armed conflict between nations.
The lines between war and peace in the gray zone
are blurred, and competition occurs across all instruments of national power. Further, a state conducts
actions employing the instruments of national power
both overtly and covertly to advance its interests. The
appeal of “fighting” in the gray zone is that it allows
a weaker state to achieve its foreign policy objectives,
such as regime change or acquiring territory, without
resorting to full-scale military campaigns. Therefore,
weaker states often turn to gray zone methods when
challenging stronger states that have a significant military advantage. Examples of gray zone tactics include
cyberattacks, information operations and propaganda, deception, sabotage, proxy war, assassinations,
espionage, economic coercion, violations of international law, and terrorism.8 Operating in the gray zone
requires great skill and a clear understanding of the
red lines, two areas the Russians have proven to be
extraordinarily adept in since the beginning of the 21st
century.9

Figure 1-2. Characteristics of the Gray Zone10
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HOW IS RUSSIA EXPLOITING THE GRAY ZONE?
Since first coming to power in 1999, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy has grown
increasingly antagonistic toward the United States
and its allies. While there have been periods of postCold War U.S.-Russian cooperation, today’s relationship is severely strained, and Russia’s foreign policy
is predominantly anti-United States. Clinging to a
“besieged fortress” mentality, Putin seeks to establish a balance of power with the West by undermining
U.S. influence and returning the Russian state to the
glory days of the Soviet Union where Russia is recognized on the world stage as a great power.11 Consequently, he directed a series of carefully crafted overt
and covert gray zone actions aimed at upending the
international order established by the United States
over the last 8 decades while avoiding a major Western military response (see figure 1-3).
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Figure 1-3. Russian Gray Zone Actions12
THE GERASIMOV DOCTRINE
In 2013, General Valery Gerasimov, Russia’s
senior-most military officer, published an article in
the Military-Industrial Kurier, titled “The Value of Science is in the Foresight.” The strategy presented in this
article, now referred to as the Gerasimov Doctrine,
updates Soviet-era active measures into modern day
asymmetric tactics. The strategy portrays an idea of
total war without declaring war or using conventional
forces in traditional ways. Gerasimov writes:

7

In the twenty-first century, we have seen a tendency
toward blurring the lines between the states of war and
peace. Wars are no longer declared and, having begun,
proceed according to an unfamiliar template. . . . The very
“rules of war” have changed. The role of nonmilitary
means of achieving political and strategic goals has
grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power
of force of weapons in their effectiveness.13

Influenced by the Arab Spring uprising, Gerasimov observed what a dissatisfied population could
do to destabilize a government, create chaos, and
upset the balance of power. He envisioned that similar tactics could have the same effect against Russia’s
adversaries by creating an environment rife with political chaos and unrest. The Gerasimov Doctrine is not
groundbreaking in the way it describes the nature of
future conflict, and many of its tenets have been in the
Russian playbook for a long time. Today’s advances in
information technology, however, have significantly
changed the landscape of gray zone conflict. In 2014,
Putin officially approved Gerasimov’s ideas in the
Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. The doctrine
describes Russia’s view of modern warfare as the:
integrated employment of military force and political,
economic, informational or other non-military measures
implemented with a wide use of the protest potential of
the population and of special operations forces.14

Analysis of these Russian source documents provides great value for U.S. policymakers; they depict,
in part, how Putin and his generals define their current operating environment. Before developing
counter-strategies, U.S. policymakers must fully
grasp the Russian playbook and its ultimate goal of
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subverting U.S. influence and undermining democratic institutions.
GRAY ZONE CHALLENGES
The gray zone presents myriad challenges for
U.S. policymakers. Russia’s gray zone operations
are intentionally ambiguous and employ asymmetric techniques in order to minimize the potential for
a U.S. conventional warfare response.15 Russia recognizes that the United States is uncomfortable and has
self-imposed limitations operating in uncertain environments, so it exploits this space in order to achieve
its strategic objectives without much resistance. The
United States must scrupulously examine these gray
zone challenges and develop a strategy to confront
Russia without major escalation. Among the biggest
challenges are strategic culture, organizational design,
gray zone detection, ethical dilemmas, and legal
constraints.
Strategic Culture
The U.S. failure to understand the gray zone represents a shortfall in its strategic culture.16 While
Russia has turned to the gray zone to pursue its strategic objectives, the United States largely continues to
conceptualize conflict through the traditional blackand-white model of war and peace.17 U.S. policymakers have been slow and in many cases failed to
recognize the changing character of war. Instead, they
continue to focus on conventional military warfare
while marginalizing the other critical instruments of
national power. Competing in the gray zone requires
a paradigm shift in U.S. strategy, as today’s approach
enables Russian aggression.18
9

Organizational Seams
The design of the U.S. national security enterprise
inherently hinders whole-of-government responses
to gray zone attacks. Organizational seams between
departments and agencies make it difficult to address
challenges that are multifaceted and simultaneously
political and military in nature.19 Moreover, interagency decision-making is problematic because there
is:
no common chain of command short of the President,
no capability for strategic planning for a whole-ofgovernment effort, and no established structure for
management and coordination of implementation across
the federal government.20

For example, the U.S. intelligence community is wellsuited to infiltrate Russian networks, but not specifically designed to monitor political influencing or
meddling campaigns. Policymakers throughout the
national security enterprise must be cognizant of these
seams when developing whole-of-government strategies in the gray zone.
Gray Zone Detection
Attacks in the gray zone are difficult to defend
against and usually hard to detect because they are
often hidden, undeclared, and ambiguous.21 Further,
gray zone actions are inherently deceptive in nature
making them difficult to discern, which makes it even
more challenging to identify the actor responsible for
effecting them.22 Russia’s use of propaganda, misinformation, cyberattacks, and the dissemination of fake
news via social media and other outlets are examples
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of gray zone attacks that took weeks or months to
pinpoint.
Ethical Dilemmas
Gray zone actors often employ unconventional tactics that arguably skirt ethical boundaries. Although
the Russians have effectively used these tactics without concern for ethics, the use of such methods by the
U.S. Government might clash with American values
and could have a detrimental effect. Therefore, before
engaging in similar tactics, U.S. policymakers must
carefully measure ethical risk to ensure that the benefit outweighs the cost and is necessary to protect U.S.
interests and values.
Legal Constraints
Consideration of international and domestic laws
presents policymakers with additional challenges
when working to develop options in the gray zone.
The Law of Armed Conflict provides the legal framework for public international law and outlines acceptable wartime conduct.23 In addition, international
agreements or treaties also legally bind the United
States to certain sets of rules.24 International law does
not clearly address acceptable norms when operating
in many areas of the gray zone. The ambiguous nature
of gray zone activity coupled with a lack of clearly
defined law, therefore, makes it difficult to hold
gray zone actors accountable and develop acceptable
countermeasures.
The gray zone also presents challenges with respect
to domestic law, specifically with respect to the First
Amendment. Countering certain gray zone tactics
such as a misinformation campaign have proven to be
11

particularly problematic with respect to free speech.
Consequently, U.S. policymakers find themselves
struggling with the notion of how free speech applies
to the gray zone. Moving forward, U.S. policymakers
must conduct a comprehensive review of pertinent
domestic and international laws, as well as recognize
that statutory changes may be required in order for
U.S. agencies to respond to gray zone attacks without
legal repercussions.25
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CHAPTER 2. THE ACTION VERSUS INACTION
CONUNDRUM
A strategist should think in terms of paralysing, not killing
. . . psychological pressure on the government of a country
may suffice to cancel all the resources at its command—so
that the sword drops from a paralysed hand.1
—Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart, British Strategist &
Military Historian

Russia believes, and its strategy reflects, that it
is involved in a continuous state of conflict with the
West.2 Russia’s exploitation of the gray zone, therefore, makes perfect sense and is absolutely in its best
interest. After all, Russia’s military size and strength
wane in comparison to its most dangerous adversary,
the United States, and its economy is anything but
strong and stable.3 Moreover, Russia faces a fast-rising
power and explosive economy to its east in China and
looks west toward a watchful North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). Its south looks no more promising, where it shares a border with a hostile Ukraine
and stands only a few hundred miles from a menacing
Turkey (see figure 2-1). Collectively, these facts paint
an ominous portrait of Russia’s losing hand in relation
to its geography and competitors. With its shaky economy and conventional military disadvantage, Russia
resorts to engaging in a low-cost, unconventional gray
zone war to expand its regional influence and compete
with other world powers such as the United States.4
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Note: NATO countries are shown in black.

Figure 2-1. Russia’s View of the Region5
Understanding Russia’s hand and its view of the
region and world in terms of competition is essential
to overcoming the “Action vs. Inaction Conundrum.”
From the Russian strategic perspective, it is using ingenuity to overcome its military and economic shortfalls to compete and expand its influence best, and
it is doing so quite efficaciously. Because gray zone
tactics and conflict are nonlinear with respect to conventional military methods or campaigns, they cause
opponents a great deal of confusion when considering
a response.6 The ensuing conundrum disrupts strategic risk calculations by presenting a paralyzing choice
between action and inaction.7
When faced with this conundrum, the United
States must wholly assess the axiom that action and
inaction are equally unpalatable.8 On the one hand, if
the United States takes no action, its political system,
credibility, and influence, among other things, will
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remain under constant subversive attack. On the other
hand, if the United States does act, it risks potential
escalation through strategic miscalculation. In other
words, the wrong action or too much action could
result in unintended consequences that are more
severe than maintaining the status quo. To date, the
United States has fallen victim to this paralysis, and
it clearly lacks a coherent strategy for dealing with
Russia in the gray zone.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. INACTION:
THE STATUS QUO APPROACH
What is at Stake—Can the United States Afford the
Status Quo Approach?
When determining whether the United States
should take swifter and more profound action to deter
Russian gray zone activity, one must first consider
what is at stake. Table 2-1 details the various pros
and cons associated with inaction, or the “status quo
approach.” The following discourse further examines
and takes a more in-depth look into these pros and
cons.
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Examining Inaction
Pros

Cons

•

Buys time to develop a more comprehensive strategy or
approach.

•

Continued loss of key territories that could upset the postWorld War II balance of power
(1945-present).

•

Conserves resources
and policymakers’
attention for more
urgent matters.

•

Erosion of Western influence
and democracy at home and
abroad.

•

Eliminates immediate escalation concern.

•

Loss of credibility, both domestically and internationally.

•

Remains within the
American public’s
tolerance threshold.

•

Adaptation and emulation of
gray zone tactics by other actors (e.g., rising powers, competitors, rogue states, etc.).

•

Continued paralysis stemming
from the action versus inaction
conundrum.

Table 2-1. Pros and Cons of Inaction
Buys Time and Conserves Resources and
Policymakers’ Attention for More Urgent Matters
The concepts of buying time and conserving
resources are interrelated. When considering them
as factors, policymakers must clearly understand the
tradeoff cost associated with deferring them. Often,
these factors are miscalculated and fall victim to backburner politics. History shows that the United States
tends to respond in whole to only the immediate, or
most urgent, fires.
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North Korea is a key example of the failure of
back-burner politics. The United States has been in a
struggle with North Korea over the development and
subsequent proliferation of nuclear weapons since the
early 1990s.9 While the United States made sporadic
yet more dogged diplomatic efforts to address this
issue in recent years, its attention and resources were
largely diverted to other, more urgent matters such
as the post-9/11 Global War on Terrorism campaign
and Iraq war. This “kicking the can down the road”
approach to dealing with North Korea proved quite
costly and is currently coming to a head. Today, North
Korea is one of only nine nuclear states and is estimated to possess somewhere between 13 to 30 nuclear
warheads, posing a grave threat to the United States
and some of its closest allies.10
The United States, however, must be careful not
to overcommit its resources, which is a legitimate
concern anytime it earnestly considers the option of
action. It is imperative that the United States choose
its engagements wisely, especially when it is involved
on multiple fronts as it is today. As will be detailed
further in later chapters, resourcefulness will be paramount when dealing with the Russian gray zone
problem.
Key Questions for Policymakers Regarding Time
• If not now, when?
• Is there ever a good time? If so, when is the right
time?
• What is currently at stake?
• What might we lose if we do not take action
now, and what is at stake in the future?
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• What will the strategic picture look like at the
time at which action is considered or taken if we
maintain the status quo approach for the near
future?
Key Questions for Policymakers Regarding Resources
• How many resources must we commit?
• What type of resources such as military, diplomatic, economic, and more must we commit?
• Can we use resources already in place, or must
we provide new or additional resources?
• How much will this cost, both financially and
politically?
• What is the domestic tolerance threshold, and
will the people support it?
Eliminates Immediate Escalation Concern
One benefit of the status quo approach is that it
appears to eliminate the immediate threat of escalation. If the United States takes no action, then it significantly reduces its risk of a major conflict with Russia
in the near-term. Under this notion, however, Russia
will continue to exploit the gray zone further in order
to advance its national strategic goals. Moreover, if not
met with some level of resistance, Russia will likely
increase the propensity of its activities in the gray
zone, which would help it to achieve its objectives
faster and most likely result in conflict anyway.
Key Questions for Policymakers Regarding Escalation
• If we do not take action, is there a chance that
escalation may occur anyway?
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• What other factors might lead to future
escalation?
• What is our response if our allies, specifically
our NATO allies, are drawn into conflict?
• What is at stake, and what do we afford to lose
if we take no action at all?
• What will the strategic picture look like at the
time at which action is considered or taken if we
maintain the status quo approach indefinitely?
Remains within the American Public’s
Tolerance Threshold
Policymakers must also weigh domestic tolerability. The United States is currently engaged in two
drawn-out conflicts that have endured for the past 16
years, and there exists the potential for a large-scale
conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Current sentiment
among the American public is that it does not want to
risk more American lives in conflict.11
The wars in Afghanistan and against the Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant, however, are vastly comprised of hostile combat actions that result in human
casualties. Operating in the gray zone, on the other
hand, is limited in scope and short-of-war by nature,
and therefore does not generally risk human life. If the
United States permits Russia to advance its goals by
operating in the gray zone unimpededly, it risks eventual escalation into a full-fledged conventional conflict
that will likely result in a significant loss of American
lives.
Key Questions for Policymakers Regarding Tolerability
• How many conflicts is the United States currently engaged in, considering both major and
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•
•
•
•

minor conflicts, as well as any “unknown”
conflicts?
Can the United States afford to take action now
or later?
Are American lives at risk?
Does action require significant risk to American
lives?
Does inaction pose a significant risk to U.S.
national security?

“DAMNED IF YOU DON’T, NOT IF YOU DO”—
A CALL FOR ACTION
Since Russia perceives itself to be in a perpetual
state of conflict with the West, and because its gray
zone campaign has been largely effective, it can be
concluded that Russia will continue exploiting the
gray zone until deterred or met with tangible resistance. A 9-month study conducted by the U.S. Army
War College’s (USAWC) Strategic Studies Institute
(SSI) determined that inaction leads to great risk in the
gray zone and that by taking no action or deferring:
You can easily wish away adverse consequences, but it’s
your absolute worst choice. What happens is if you don’t
act to blunt the challenges up front, then facts change on
the ground to such an extent that it becomes eventually
unthinkable to reverse them through more assertive
action. If you wait things out, your opponent will nibble
and nibble and nibble away until all of a sudden they just
gobble up something that’s very important to you.12

The consequences of inaction are more severe than
the cost of action (see table 2-2). Further, maintaining the status quo approach does nothing to change
Russian behavior. Therefore, the United States should
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take carefully measured action now to avoid a major
escalation later.
Examining Action
Pros

Cons

•

Prevents loss of key
territories and preserves the post-World
War II balance of power (1945-present).

•

Risk of major escalation can
lead to conventional conflict
and loss of human life.

•

Preserves Western influence and democracy
at home and abroad
(Eastern Europe).

•

Risk of severe escalation can
lead to nuclear war and catastrophic loss of human life.

•

Prevents loss of credibility, both domestically and internationally.

•

Potentially costly concerning
resources and time.

•

Deters other actors
from engaging in gray
zone activities.

•

Could exceed American tolerance threshold.

Table 2-2. Pros and Cons of Taking Action
The Goals and Application of Action
The Goals of Action Should . . .
• Incorporate the appropriate risk necessary to
achieve desired outcomes.
• Demonstrate to Russia that there are tangible consequences for gray zone activities that
directly or indirectly undermine U.S. national
security interests domestically or abroad.
• Prevent Russia’s further usurpation or occupation of key territories in the region.
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• Preserve the post-World War II balance of
power (1945-present).
• Preserve Western influence and democracy at
home and abroad, and most critically in Eastern
Europe.
• Preserve U.S. global and domestic credibility.
• Ultimately, deter Russian gray zone activity by
and large.
The Application of Action Should . . .
• Be carefully measured and slightly more significant than the trigger invoking it.
• Employ asymmetric responses, such as if Russia
does X, the United States will respond with Y.
• Be applied in such a fashion that prevents escalation into major conflict, especially nuclear
war.
• Have clearly defined goals aimed at achieving
desired outcomes.
• Incorporate a combination of overt and covert
action.
• Be applied consistent with American values and
within the public’s tolerance threshold.
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CHAPTER 3. RETHINKING DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA: THE COMMON
GROUND APPROACH
The best thing we can do if we want the Russians to let us
be Americans is to let the Russians be Russian.1
—George F. Kennan, (1984)
U.S. Diplomat

George F. Kennan was a famous American diplomat best known for writing the 1947 Foreign Affairs
article, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” which heavily influenced National Security Council Report-68
and the containment policy responsible for driving
U.S. dealings with Russia from 1950 until the fall of
the Soviet Union. Kennan’s quote shows how he later
flipped positions on how best to deal with Russia,
advocating for meaningful dialogue instead of heavily militarized containment. If Kennan were still alive,
he would surely offer a similar critique of today’s
U.S. foreign policy—that it emphasizes conventional
military strength over diplomacy and lacks strategic
coherency with respect to dealing with Russia in the
gray zone.
Today’s dynamic with Russia is drastically different from the one that existed from 1991 to 2014.
Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine and its subsequent
annexation of Crimea completely changed the postCold War paradigm between the East and West.
While extremely damaging to U.S.-Russian relations,
the United States cannot allow those inflection points
to create a total barrier to constructive dialogue and
cooperation as it does today. Instead, the United
States needs to realize and come to grips with Russia’s duplicity as both an adversarial competitor and
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global partner. In dealing with the former, the United
States should continue to use information, economic,
and military instruments of power to respond to Russian aggression and violations of international law.
However, in dealing with the latter, the U.S. strategy
should be diplomatic and predicated upon finding
common ground (see figure 3-1).

Figure 3-1. A Common Ground Approach
to Diplomacy with Russia2
By identifying and working through areas of
common ground via multi-track diplomacy, U.S. diplomats and officials can begin to reestablish relationships, engage in negotiations, and build trust with their
Russian counterparts. Specifically, multi-track diplomacy utilizes a layered blend of governmental and
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influential nongovernmental persons to move negotiations forward in a contentious environment. The
former is commonly referred to as “Track 1,” while the
latter is referred to as “Track 2.” Track 2 diplomacy is
most beneficial in situations where policy restrictions
or other obstacles prevent formal political representatives (Track 1) from direct engagement. While clearly
not the ultimate solution to the U.S.-Russian relational
problem, the common ground approach incorporating multi-track diplomacy does provide a real starting
point to jumpstart cooperation between the two countries. Improved cooperation, in turn, can stimulate
more transparent and meaningful dialogue vis-à-vis
the gray zone, which is essential to keeping U.S.-Russian rising tension and potential for conflict at bay.
Table 3-1 identifies eight areas of common ground that
the United States and Russia should begin exploring
immediately, and the rest of this chapter elaborates
upon them in more detail.

Examples of Common Ground
• Reset Diplomatic Staffing Levels.
• Promoting NATO-Russian Relations.
• Military-to-Military Cooperation.
• Cybersecurity.

• Stability in Syria.
• Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security.
• Arms Control.
• Space Exploration.

Table 3-1. Examples of Common Ground
RESET DIPLOMATIC STAFFING LEVELS
The Russian tampering of the 2016 U.S. Presidential election was yet another significant inflection point
causing a strain in relations between the United States
and Russia. In retaliation, the United States expelled
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35 Russian diplomats.3 The Russians, exchanging
blows, expelled 755 U.S. diplomats and their technical staffs after the U.S. Congress imposed sanctions.4
The United States then closed the Russian consulate
in San Francisco and the Russian diplomatic annexes
in New York and Washington.5 While these tit-for-tat
exchanges seem warranted at face value, they only
widen a diplomatic gap between two nations with
a history of animosity. In order to close the gap, the
United States and Russia must find common ground
through diplomacy, and the restoration of diplomatic
staffing levels would be an appropriate first step in
achieving this goal.
Although tactics such as expelling diplomats and
closing consulates may seem like effective punishment tools, they dually create barriers to communication and the advancement of national interests.
Returning these officials back to their posts can help
bolster relationships, communicate national interests, and help the other side understand their nation’s
views on policies and areas of disagreement.6 In turn,
this sets the conditions for constructive negotiations,
which are essential to finding other areas of common
ground. Although the United States and Russia are
divergent on many issues, strong diplomatic relations
is an area of common ground that can help both countries advance their political, economic, and security
interests.
PROMOTING NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ORGANIZATION (NATO)-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
In 2014, despite several years of consistent
NATO-Russian communications, NATO suspended
all practical cooperation with Russia in retribution for
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its unlawful annexation of Crimea.7 Although a justifiable response to a maneuver that upset international
order and security, isolating Russia is not a pragmatic, long-term strategy. It is paramount for NATO
and Russia to come back to the table sooner rather
than later, open the lines of communication, and find
common ground. Furthermore, the United States:
should take reasonable actions alongside its NATO allies
to reassure Russian political and military officials and
the Russian public that the United States and NATO
have defensive intentions and do not threaten Russian
territory.8

As long as Russia perceives NATO as an offensive
existential threat, it will continue its campaign of
aggressive behavior against the United States and its
allies in the gray zone.
One recent success in NATO-Russia relations
was the reconvening of the NATO-Russia Council
(NRC), where all 29 NATO countries and Russia come
together as equal partners to discuss security issues,
identify emerging problems, and develop shared
approaches to resolving disagreements. In the Warsaw
Summit Communique, NATO stated that it was:
open to a periodic, focused and meaningful dialogue
with a Russia willing to engage on the basis of reciprocity
in the NRC, with a view to avoiding misunderstanding,
miscalculation, and unintended escalation, and to
increase transparency and predictability.9

The NRC met three times in 2016 and twice in both
2017 and 2018. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, who chaired the first meeting of 2018, noted that
the allies and Russia had an open and useful exchange
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on three topics: Ukraine, Afghanistan, and transparency and risk reduction.10
The NRC has proved to be a critical venue in
enhancing NATO-Russia cooperation and multilateral
communication. In further developing these relationships, NATO should look to reintroduce Russia into
other NATO-led international forums and conventions, as well as sustain the frequency of NRC events
exhibited in the last several years.
MILITARY-TO-MILITARY COOPERATION
Up until 2014, Russia and the United States collaborated extensively in fighting terrorism post-9/11.
The NRC was the primary driver in this cooperative
effort; it provided an appropriate venue for Russian
support of a number of antiterrorism initiatives outlined in the NRC Action Plan on Terrorism. Examples
of this cooperation included a civil-military tabletop
exercise in 2012, counter-piracy operations off the
Horn of Africa in 2008, the Cooperative Airspace Initiative born out of 9/11, and the Stand-off Detection of
Explosives project, which was a science and technology effort meant to protect mass transit locations from
bombs.11 While the NRC has begun meeting again on
a regular basis, the cooperative effort with Russia on
international counterterrorism has not resumed.
U.S.-Russian military-to-military relations have
also diminished since 2014, a dangerous development that heightens the risk of miscalculation on
both sides. The United States codified its restrictions
in the 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019 National Defense
Authorization Acts (NDAA), which prohibit “any
bilateral military-to-military cooperation” between
the U.S. military and Russia.12 The Supreme Allied
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Commander Europe in his NATO capacity, however,
retains the authority to conduct military-to-military
engagements with Russia and should do so whenever practical to maintain lines of communication
and deconflict efforts between military forces. Moreover, the United States should begin lifting NDAA
restrictions on military-to-military cooperation with
Russia in order to promote dialogue and transparency
between traditionally opposed forces.
Another step in the right direction took place in
February 2017, when the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, General Joseph Dunford, met with his Russian counterpart, General Valery Gerasimov, in Baku,
Azerbaijan to discuss important military issues. While
the Pentagon reaffirmed that this did not signal a
return to pre-Ukraine relations, the meeting between
the two senior-most military officials opened a new
line of communication.13 Importantly, this line of communication is pivotal in raising military situational
awareness and preventing military miscalculations.
It also provides the top generals with the information
necessary to provide the best military advice to their
respective presidents, which better informs political
decisions involving the use of the military instrument.
CYBERSECURITY
In September 2015, President Barack Obama and
President Xi Jinping of China signed a historic agreement on cybersecurity. The agreement stated that both
countries would “mitigate malicious cyber activity
emanating from their territory.”14 Could the United
States and Russia come to a similar type of agreement?
The Russians, like the Chinese, have a history of
alleged state-sponsored hacking and online influence
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operations that began well before the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. Nonetheless, the potential exists for
common ground in the cyber arena. Both leaders recognized this when they met for the first time during the
July 2017 Group of 20 Summit in Germany.15 Following this meeting, President Donald Trump tweeted:
“Putin & I discussed forming an impenetrable Cyber
Security unit so that election hacking, & many other
negative things, will be guarded.”16
Trump was quickly criticized by the press and
lawmakers such as Senator Lindsey Graham, who
commented that the idea of working with Russia on
cybersecurity was “not the dumbest idea I’ve ever
heard, but it’s pretty close.”17 Based on historical precedent, Senator Graham’s comments might not be too
farfetched. However, while establishing a combined
cybersecurity organization of U.S. and Russian personnel sounds dubious, it could be beneficial for a
number of reasons. For example, it would provide
a venue to bring the United States and Russia to the
negotiating table to discuss the rules of law and international norms regarding cyber-operations. Moreover,
a cyber-agreement could promote the responsible use
of cyber capabilities and contribute to a reduction in
international cybercrime.
SYRIA
It is not out of the question for the United States and
Russia to find some common ground in Syria. In a July
2017 statement, former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson
said, “The U.S. and Russia certainly have unresolved
differences on a number of issues, but we have the
potential to appropriately coordinate in Syria in order
to produce stability and serve our mutual security
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interests.”18 Putin further declared, “Syria can become
a model for partnership in the name of common interests [with the United States], resolving problems that
affect everyone, and developing an effective risk-management system.”19 Finding common ground in
resolving such a significant regional crisis could be a
vital stepping-stone in improving relations between
the two powers.
The predominant goals of the United States and
Russia in Syria are not too dissimilar—both countries
want to preserve stability in Syria, combat terrorism,
stop the regime’s use of chemical weapons, and prevent refugee spillover into surrounding areas. Where
the U.S. and Russia differ are mainly with respect to
the identification of the enemy and whether the Assad
regime should remain in power.20
From the Russian perspective of viewing Libya
and Iraq as recent examples of failed Western intervention, it is in Russia’s best interest to keep Assad in
power for at least the interim to avoid total collapse
and disorder.21 The resulting refugee crisis, Russia
asserts, would mobilize terrorists and create a major
crisis both within and on its borders.22 Keeping Assad
in power would also ensure its continued access to its
critical Mediterranean naval port facility in Tartus.
Hence, Russia argues that unless there is a comprehensive and viable post-Assad plan in place, Assad
should currently remain in power to maintain some
level of stability in the region.23
It is imperative that the United States and Russia
consider each other’s national security concerns and
work together to solve the Syrian crisis. In Syria, the
ubiquitous common ground between the United
States and Russia is regional stability. Consequently,
since Russia does not necessarily assert that Assad is
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the long-term answer, the two nations should work
cooperatively with the United Nations (UN) to find
a solution that ultimately replaces Assad and secures
Syria’s borders while a new and more responsible
form of government comes to power.
NONPROLIFERATION AND
NUCLEAR SECURITY
Ironically, despite being on the brink of a nuclear
holocaust at the height of the Cold War, the United
States and Russia have and can continue to find
common ground in nuclear nonproliferation and security. Many strategists believe, and evidence demonstrates, that the nuclear issue is one of the few concrete
areas where mutual interests between the United
States and Russia are most analogous.24
However, in the past 4 years, U.S.-Russian cooperation on the nuclear security agenda has deteriorated.25
In response to sanctions stemming from its behavior in
Crimea, in 2014, Russia vastly cut-off nuclear cooperation with the United States.26 In 2016, it refused to take
part in the world’s fourth and final Nuclear Security
Summit.27 Russia’s abrupt, dangerous halt to nuclear
cooperation is consistent with the tit-for-tat exchanges
that have characterized U.S.-Russian relations since
2014.
The United States and Russia share numerous roles
and responsibilities in the international nonproliferation and nuclear security arenas. First, they comprise
two of the three Nonproliferation Treaty depositary
governments. Second, they are both leading members
of the International Atomic Energy Agency board.
Third, they both are permanent members of the UN
Security Council. Finally, they were key participants
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in both the Iranian-P5+1 talks and Six-Party Talks with
North Korea.28 While Russia’s modus operandi may
ultimately differ from the United States, these interlocking roles and responsibilities at least compel them
to cooperate and encourage them to find common
ground.
Proliferation metastasizes threats, further complicates the geopolitical picture, and contributes to
global instability. Consequently, the United States and
Russia share common ground in stopping the spread
of nuclear weapons to additional countries and preventing terrorists’ access to them or related material.29
Further, neither desires a direct military confrontation,
especially one involving the use of nuclear weapons.
The United States should take a cooperative angle
and expand upon these existing common grounds to
improve its relationship with Russia. A recent example of common ground development was the Obama
administration’s work on the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action, often referred to as the Iran Nuclear
Deal. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action typified the give-and-take nature of the common ground
approach. Though at face value many criticized the
agreement for its imperfectness, it represented the culmination of 18 months of hard-fought diplomatic and
concessional negotiations between the United States,
Russia, and several other countries.30 Collectively,
these outcomes can help the United States and Russia
begin to establish a precedent in other challenging and
multifaceted areas such as the gray zone.
ARMS CONTROL
Another key strategic area where the United States
and Russia have found common ground is in arms
control. During a lull in Russian gray zone activity
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from 2009 to 2010, President Obama and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev oversaw tense negotiations,
which included 10 rounds of talks conducted over the
course of 12 months to hammer out the New Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty (New START).31 The 10-year
treaty went into effect on February 5, 2011, with an
option to extend for 5 years. New START also contains caveats allowing one or both parties to opt out,
thereby collapsing the agreement.32 The treaty aimed
to reduce both nations’ deployed strategic nuclear
warheads and bombs by 30 percent by 2018, while
containing both monitoring and verification protocols, but not impeding the U.S. ability to develop and
deploy ballistic missile defenses.33
Despite overwhelming bipartisan support for New
START (the Senate ratified it with a 71 to 26 vote), this
area of common ground is now at risk.34 In a January
28, 2017 phone call between Trump and Putin, the
Russian leader suggested an extension of the treaty,
which Trump, after conferring with aides, promptly
dismissed.35 Then, in a February 23, 2017 interview
with Reuters, President Trump disparaged the New
START, proclaiming: “It’s a one-sided deal. It gave
them things that we should have never allowed. . . .
Just another bad deal that the country made.”36
In light of recent tensions, opting out of New
START or failing to execute the 5-year extension of
the treaty with Russia would be imprudent for the
United States. By opting out, the United States stands
to erase 30 years of successful nuclear arms control
with Russia. The treaty marks one of the few diplomatic successes between the United States and Russia
in recent years, allowing both nations to retain their
nuclear deterrent while simultaneously contributing
to nonproliferation goals.
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SPACE EXPLORATION
A unique area of U.S.-Russian relations that seems
impervious to mounting tensions is the International Space Station (ISS). Since the retirement of its
space shuttle program in 2011, the United States has
relied exclusively on Russian rockets, launched out of
Kazakhstan, to get its astronauts to and from the ISS.37
Despite not having a manned space launch capability
of its own, this arrangement has enabled the United
States to maintain a manned presence aboard the ISS.
From Russia’s perspective, it has been a welcome
boost to a sputtering economy by netting $81 million
per American seat aboard its Soyuz capsules. Notably, the Americans and Russians have teamed up on
52 joint ISS missions, and astronauts and cosmonauts
have been cohabitating aboard the ISS since November 2, 2000.38 Strategically, the United States needs this
cooperation to continue, until it can either build a new
space shuttle of its own or contract manned space-lift
services from the private sector.
While Russians clearly maintain the upper hand in
this area of cooperation, it is nonetheless remarkable
considering that the space race was one of the most
competitive aspects of the Cold War. Cooperation in
this arena makes perfect sense, though, because it is
exorbitantly expensive to do alone and serves both
countries’ interests. The ISS is the most expensive thing
ever built. The project has cost approximately $160 billion to date, and the United States continues to contribute nearly $3 billion per year to it.39 Demonstrating
both sides’ commitment to further cooperation, the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) and Roscosmos issued a joint statement on
September 27, 2017, calling for the two space agencies
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to work together in developing a “deep space gateway” in orbit around the moon.40 While continuing to
support this critical space exploration endeavor, policymakers should examine it closely and look to apply
lessons learned to other areas of common ground.
CONCLUSION
As tensions from Russia’s gray zone aggressions
in Ukraine and Crimea linger, the aperture for finding common ground is quickly closing. While the
common ground approach is not the only diplomatic tool available to the United States, it represents
the most impactful dimension of this instrument
of national power when dealing with an obstinate
Russia. The United States must seize the opportunity
to find common ground with Russia now in order to
rebuild some of the vital partnerships and cooperation
that existed in the period before 2014. Only then will
the United States and Russia be able to have a worthwhile dialogue with respect to setting a precedent and
establishing rules in the gray zone.
Policy Recommendations for Achieving and Sustaining Diplomacy with Russia
• Reset U.S.-Russia diplomatic staffing to pre2016 sanction levels;
• Promote cooperation and diplomatic engagement via the NRC and other NATO forums;
• Renew the U.S.-Russia military-to-military relationship, and lift NDAA restrictions;
• Explore opportunities for cybersecurity initiatives with Russia;
• Collaborate with Russia on a short- and longterm strategy in Syria;
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• Work together to pursue global nonproliferation and nuclear security initiatives;
• Negotiate a 5-year extension of the New START
Treaty; and,
• Continue cooperation in multinational space
exploration efforts.
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CHAPTER 4. SHAPING THE INFORMATION
ENVIRONMENT
Moscow seeks to create wedges that reduce trust and
confidence in democratic processes, degrade democratization efforts, weaken US partnerships with European
allies, undermine Western sanctions, encourage anti-US
political views, and counter efforts to bring Ukraine and
other former Soviet states into European institutions. . . .
At a minimum, we expect Russia to continue using propaganda, social media, false-flag personas, sympathetic
spokespeople, and other means of influence to try to exacerbate social and political fissures in the United States.1
—Daniel R. Coats, Director of
National Intelligence (2018)

The United States, who paved the way for today’s
globally connected and technology-driven world, is
losing ground to Russia in the information domain.
Russia has proven itself highly adept in this space,
which consists of “the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate,
or act on information.”2 Today, Russia’s misinformation campaign is multidimensional and extends
well beyond its near abroad, targeting the institutions and populations of the entire North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) Alliance. The Russians
have been particularly creative in using the Internet
to undermine Western influence and democracies by
exploiting seams in civil societies. The Russians have
mastered a phenomenon that Emily Thorson of Syracuse University coined the “Belief Echo.” The Belief
Echo occurs through automatic or deliberative processes and results when “exposure to negative political information continues to shape attitudes even after
the information has been effectively discredited.”3
Not surprisingly, her experiments demonstrate that
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misinformation campaigns are highly effective when
targeting is properly assessed, which is not difficult to
do when aiming at today’s overly partisan U.S. political landscape.
The lack of U.S. policy to counter this growing misinformation threat was most apparent following the
2016 U.S. Presidential election, where the Russians
directly attacked the U.S. democratic process with little
to no repercussions. The information environment is
a competitive space shaped by narratives, and whoever controls the narrative best controls the domain.
As summarized in the U.S. intelligence community’s
assessment above, the Russians are vigorously controlling the narrative and attempting to outpace the
United States in the information space. If the United
States fails to reshape the narrative, it risks losing further ground in this critical space. Consequently, the
United States must act now to regain ground in the
information environment, taking a proactive posture
instead of a reactive one.
U.S. policymakers must carefully construct
overt and covert measures while committing ample
resources to regain information dominance over
Russia. The key to policy development is viewing the
information environment through both an overseas
and domestic lens and includes:
Overseas:
• Fully funding the Department of State’s Global
Engagement Center (GEC);
• Supporting NATO information operations; and,
• Employing covert actions.
Domestic:
• Creating an Office of Foreign Influence (OFI);
• Drafting of key legislation by Congress; and,
• Presidential support and leadership.
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FIGHTING RUSSIAN MISINFORMATION
OVERSEAS I: THE GEC
U.S. efforts to fight propaganda and spread American influence are far from novel; they have been
going on in some form or another since World War
II. Currently, the cornerstone of these efforts resides
with the Department of State’s GEC. The GEC was
established by Executive order in March 2016 and is
responsible for “coordinating U.S. counterterrorism
messaging to foreign audiences,” specifically those
of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.4 The 2017
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) further
funded and expanded the GEC’s mission to “counter
foreign state and non-state propaganda and disinformation efforts aimed at undermining U.S. national
security interests.”5 The Department of Defense (DoD)
allocated $60 million of the fiscal year (FY) 2017 funds
to the cause, and Congress made $250 million available in FY 2018 and FY 2019 to fund a new Countering Russian Influence Fund. The Countering Russian
Influence Fund was included in the Russia sanctions
package passed in August 2017.6
With the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant threat
diminishing, the United States must shift its focus
toward the fast-growing Russian gray zone threat. The
new GEC funding and countering Russia initiatives
are important steps in establishing a capability that
the United States has either lacked or been reluctant
to employ against Russia. Thus, policymakers should
continue expanding the GEC’s counter-Russian role
and mission set to the maximum extent possible to
thwart Russian misinformation campaigns against the
United States and its allies.

49

The Department of State’s overseas focus, regional
expertise, and non-threatening posture make it ideally
suited to own and operate the GEC mission. However,
it would be a huge blunder to think that the Department of State singlehandedly could deal with the Russian misinformation threat. In order for this mission
to succeed, the Department of State must closely work
with and coordinate its efforts with the DoD.
The NDAA helps align efforts between the Department of State and the DoD. Specifically, it tasks each
combatant commander with coordinating their
regional information operations strategy with the
corresponding assistant secretary of state and GEC.
Effective synchronization and buy-in by both the
Department of State and the DoD will be crucial to
implementing this new information campaign against
the Russians, especially since the DoD personnel and
resources far exceed that of the Department of State
in most areas of the world. Consequently, the GEC is
supplemented by DoD personnel, as well as members
from the U.S. intelligence community, Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Broadcasting Board of
Governors.
The augmentation of additional personnel from
various agencies to the GEC is a perfect example of
a whole-of-government approach, and it is necessary
to counter the Russian misinformation threat. Specifically, it amplifies the GEC’s ability to identify and
empower overseas partners who possess the influence
and authority to counter propaganda and misinformation. In accomplishing this aspect of the mission, the
GEC offers grants to foreign nongovernmental organizations, provides data analytics to partner nations,
supports media literacy efforts abroad, purchases
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online ads in social media to counter extremist messages, and targets the mouthpieces of misinformation
to discredit them. Because its core operations take
place overseas, the GEC enjoys the freedom and flexibility to operate absent of constitutional restrictions
regarding censorship.
While the GEC concept has demonstrated the right
mix of tactics and shown promise operating in the
information environment, more capability is necessary
to deter the Russian threat. Unfortunately, the GEC,
like many good governmental initiatives, is hamstrung
by funding and therefore has not reached its fullest
potential. The Department of State’s FY 2018 budget
request represents a 34-percent decrement, dropping from $55.6 billion in FY 2017 to $37.6 billion.7 In
November 2017, former Ambassadors Nicholas Burns
and Ryan C. Crocker pointed out that growing challenges to the United States on every continent already
consume the Department of State’s resources, making
cuts in the budget that much more illogical.8 The GEC
expects to suffer commensurately from these cuts. Of
the $60 million of FY 2017 DoD augmentation funds
allocated, the Department of State is only requesting
$40 million of it.9
Back in 2013, General James Mattis emphasized the
importance of the Department of State’s role in maintaining national security and preventing conflict. Specifically, he noted that an underfunded Department
of State would require the United States to buy more
ammunition.10 It is imperative, therefore, that the
Department of State remains fully funded so that critical organizations within, such as the GEC, have the
necessary resources to carry out their mission.
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FIGHTING RUSSIAN MISINFORMATION
OVERSEAS II: NATO OVERT ACTIONS
European allies have begun taking steps to counter
the Russian threat. Many Europeans see Russia as a
serious, if not an existential threat since Putin has specifically targeted Western institutions and the NATO
alliance with active measures. In September 2014, the
NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence
became operational in Riga, Latvia with a charter to
advise NATO on information operations, psychological operations, public diplomacy, and public affairs.11
In October 2017, the European Centre of Excellence
for Countering Hybrid Threats stood up in Helsinki,
Finland to enhance partners’ civil-military capabilities, resilience, and preparedness to counter Russian
hybrid threats.12 The United States is wisely participating in both European initiatives and should continue
its support of them to the maximum extent possible
in order to confront the Russian gray zone threat to
NATO.
NATO is also enhancing its overt strategic messaging campaign. At the September 2014 Wales Summit,
it openly declared, “Russia’s aggressive actions
against Ukraine have fundamentally challenged our
vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace.”13 In the
same communique, it boldly proclaimed that a significant cyberattack against a NATO country could
trigger an Article 5 response. At the NATO Warsaw
Summit in July 2016, the Alliance affirmed that Russia’s “provocative military activities in the periphery
of NATO territory and its demonstrated willingness to
attain political goals by the threat and use of force, are
a source of regional instability.”14 Sending bold, unambiguous messages to Russia is vital in communicating
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NATO’s strength and resolve in standing up to Russia.
Moving forward, NATO should continue to explicitly call-out Russian aggression and attribute blame
at every possible opportunity to garner support and
deprecate Russia on the global stage.
FIGHTING RUSSIAN MISINFORMATION OVERSEAS III: COVERT ACTION
Covert action. . . . an activity or activities of the United
States Government to influence political, economic, or
military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the
role of the United States Government will not be apparent
or acknowledged publicly.15

Like the Department of State, the U.S. intelligence
community has an important role to play in the information environment. Its actions, however, typically
occur covertly instead of overtly. Due to their high-risk
nature, covert actions should only be used when it is
apparent that the other instruments of national power
are insufficient to achieve U.S. foreign policy goals.16
While it is conceivable that the Central Intelligence
Agency and National Security Agency are already
operating under their Title 50, U.S. Code authority,
one could certainly question the effectiveness of such
covert measures to date. The Russians seemingly have
plenty of areas that could be better exploited, such as
human rights violations and widespread government
corruption. U.S. policymakers should consider a more
robust covert action campaign that:
• Undercuts Russia’s use of active measures;
• Exposes its human rights violations on the
world stage;
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• Delegitimizes Russia’s Government by revealing large-scale corruption; and,
• Embarrasses Putin and his inner circle.
The United States has no shortage of options
when considering ways to enact this covert campaign
against Russia. Covert action can take place in many
forms to include propaganda, political or economic
action, paramilitary operations, lethal actions, and
cyber operations.17 The type and scale of such measures should vary based on the severity of Russia’s
actions. Further, those measures must be carefully
selected and implemented to reduce the risk of retaliatory escalation to the United States. In order to achieve
the aforementioned objectives, U.S. policymakers
should primarily employ a blend of cyber, political,
and economic actions against Russia in the gray zone.
FIGHTING RUSSIAN MISINFORMATION AT
HOME: THE OFI
In many ways, countering the Russian gray zone
threat at home is more challenging than it is abroad.
The GEC, for example, cannot operate within the
United States, which shifts the responsibility for countering Russian propaganda and misinformation on
U.S. soil to the DHS. Currently, the DHS does not have
an organization dedicated to this particular effort.
Further, the tactics employed by the GEC abroad are
largely exempt from First Amendment restrictions,
whereas operating in the homeland requires strict
adherence to them.
The DHS should immediately take steps to establish an entity solely dedicated to detecting and monitoring Russian gray zone activity. This research team
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suggests that the body bear the title of the OFI and that
its charter be to lead the Federal Government’s interagency efforts to detect, monitor, analyze, and expose
foreign or domestic propaganda and misinformation
efforts targeting the American people and undermining U.S. national security.
The OFI’s construct should be similar in design to
the DoD’s Joint Interagency Task Force model, which
has a single mission and is comprised of detailees from
multiple agencies and services across the U.S. Government. The Joint Interagency Task Force’s unique
construct facilitates unity of effort by harnessing all
instruments of national power to counter asymmetric
threats.18
The OFI should be comprised of players from across
the executive branch, including the U.S. intelligence
community, Department of Justice, Federal Communications Commission, Department of State, and other
pertinent agencies. The OFI workforce should consist
of a core of 60-70 highly specialized personnel trained
to identify misinformation throughout all media and
online outlets. In targeting niche skillsets, the OFI
should seek intelligence officers, information security
and technology specialists, journalists, broadcasters,
and other public affairs experts. Paramount to its functionality and ultimate success would include maintaining close ties to private technology industries, Internet
service providers, and social media platforms such as
Google, Facebook, and Twitter. Subsequently, when
the OFI discovers or identifies misinformation, it can
quickly engage these private parties to flag the information or remove it from their content. While some
contend that this would conflict with the First Amendment, there are legal and ethical ways to achieve these
results by simply pressuring these private companies
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to act more responsibly concerning the content they
distribute via their proprietary algorithms.

Figure 4-1. OFI Concept Overview19
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
Congress, too, has an important role to play in
fighting the gray zone threat domestically. In addition
to funding the OFI, it must develop and pass legislation that puts some basic regulations on the Internet
and social media platforms to increase transparency
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without violating the First Amendment. To date, these
platforms have shirked responsibility for the content on their platforms and have been clever to avoid
any new governmental regulations on their business
model.20 At a minimum, these companies should be
subject to the same standards as broadcast and print
media regarding political ads. All ads should be transparent to whoever views them, and companies should
be required to disclose the purchasing source. Facebook has already volunteered to do this and recently
hired more than 1,000 people to review political ad
purchases.21 While this constitutes a step in the right
direction, all Internet and social media companies
should follow suit.
The Honest Ads Act, which was a bipartisan piece
of legislation introduced by the 115th Congress, is
Congress’ only attempt to address these issues to date.
Succinctly, the act attempted to establish a minimum
standard for publishing online political ads. However,
the bill never made it to a vote and had some significant shortfalls. While the bill did direct the Internet
and social media platforms to reveal the purchaser
of each political ad and maintain records on all persons who spent more than $500 on ads in a year, it left
plenty of space for bad actors to operate. In addition,
the Honest Ads Act still would have allowed individuals to purchase ads anonymously or without a U.S.
bank account, and it failed to recognize Internet platforms as publishers.22 Internet platforms, therefore,
will still provide bad actors fertile ground to exploit
malicious or false content until properly recognized as
publishers.
An even larger issue not addressed by the
Honest Ads Act is Russia’s clever use of “bots” and
“trolls” to mass-produce and replicate fake news and
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misinformation posted to social media outlets. Senator Mark Warner succinctly summarized the challenge
during the Senate Intelligence Committee Open Hearing with Social Media Representatives on November
1, 2017:
Russian operatives are attempting to infiltrate and
manipulate social media to hijack the national conversation
and to make Americans angry, to set us against ourselves,
and to undermine our democracy. They did it during the
2016 U.S. Presidential campaign. They are still doing it
now. And not one of us is doing enough to stop it.23

What makes bots and trolls even more confounding is the fact that two-thirds of Americans now get
their news from social media websites.24
In tackling the bot issue, Congress should draft
additional legislation that requires private companies to distinguish between misinformation disseminated by humans and bots. Specifically, the legislation
should introduce regulations compelling them to
restrict bot activity on their platforms. Since bots are
not human, they do not retain First Amendment rights
and, therefore, are much easier to regulate.
In dealing with trolls, Congress should consider
regulations that would establish stricter identity protocols for account creation to reduce anonymity. Additionally, requiring private companies to add datelines
to posts, which automatically generate a location, or
including a user-populated rating system to evaluate
online news sources would be valuable.
In summary, Congress must take a deep dive into
the Honest Ads Act and address its many shortfalls.
It should also introduce new forms of legislation that
require private companies to police their sites, sources,
and content more effectively. Ultimately, this would
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make Internet and social media platforms subject
to the same standards as broadcast and print media
regarding political ads and make them less susceptible
to foreign exploitation.
PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP
For policy to be effective, it must have the full support and unconditional backing of the President. Further, the President must be willing to deal with Russia
in the same manner as Putin deals with the United
States. The last two administrations clearly lacked the
political will or did not want to spend their political
capital to confront the Kremlin. When the U.S. intelligence community learned of Russian meddling in the
U.S. election in the summer of 2016, President Obama
was reluctant to act due to concern over appearing
partisan during a highly volatile Presidential campaign.25 President Trump has also been disinclined to
act despite intelligence now signifying that Putin had
a personal hand in the meddling.
Without blunt acknowledgment and a firm
response from the President, Russia will undoubtedly
continue to target U.S. elections and other democratic
cornerstones with gray zone tactics. The President,
therefore, must first openly acknowledge and condemn Putin’s role in interfering with the 2016 election.
Then, he must demonstrate U.S. resiliency and resolve
by enacting the full gamut of sanctions against Russia.
Finally, he should use the bully pulpit to denounce
Russia’s actions while reaffirming his commitment to
safeguarding the foundations of democracy.
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CONCLUSION
U.S. policymakers must take action now to regain
the upper hand in the rapidly changing information
environment. In shifting the advantage, the United
States must effectively counter Russian misinformation and propaganda campaigns both domestically
and abroad. Deterring the Russians from exploiting
the gray zone’s information dimension will require
new and innovative actions from the legislative and
executive branches of government. Moreover, these
actions must be drastic enough to be efficacious without significantly clashing with American moral and
constitutional norms.
Policy Recommendations for Countering Russia in
the Information Environment
Domestic
• Establish an OFI to detect and monitor gray
zone activity.
• Draft congressional legislation to combat online
misinformation and propaganda, restrict the
use of foreign-generated bots and trolls, and
build transparency in online political ads.
• Build resiliency via Presidential actions by
denouncing Russian activities publicly.
Overseas
• Fully resource and fund the GEC to enable partners to counter propaganda and misinformation.
• Support NATO and European initiatives, such
as counter-hybrid warfare operations, and strategic communications and messaging.
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• Employ covert action to undercut Russia’s
active measures, expose human rights violations, delegitimize the Russian Government,
and embarrass Putin and his inner circle.
ENDNOTES – CHAPTER 4
1. Daniel R. Coats, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide
Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, February
13, 2018, p. 11, available from https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/
Newsroom/Testimonies/2018-ATA---Unclassified-SSCI.pdf.
2. See the definition of “information environment” in U.S.
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Washington, DC: United States
Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 2019, p. 112, available from http://
www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.
pdf?ver=2018-09-28-100314-687.
3. Emily Thorson, “Belief Echoes: The Persistent Effects of
Corrected Misinformation,” Political Communication, Vol. 33, Iss.
3, 2016 (online November 19, 2015), pp. 460–480, available from
https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2015.1102187.
4. “Global Engagement Center,” U.S. Department of State,
n.d., available from https://www.state.gov/r/gec/, accessed November 14, 2017.
5. “S.2943 - National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2017,” Congress.gov, December 23, 2016, available from
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/2943/text.
6. Mackenzie Weinger, “The U.S. Struggles against
Russian Cyber Disinformation,” The Cipher Brief, October 25, 2017, available from https://www.thecipherbrief.
com/u-s-struggles-russian-cyber-disinformation.
7. Rex W. Tillerson, “FY 2018 State Department Budget
Request,” U.S. Department of State, June 14, 2017, available
from
https://www.state.gov/secretary/20172018tillerson/
remarks/2017/06/271895.htm.

61

8. Nicholas Burns and Ryan C. Crocker, “Dismantling the
Foreign Service,” The New York Times, November 27, 2017, available from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/27/opinion/dismantlingforeign-service-budget.html.
9. Weinger.
10. Katrina Manson and Demetri Sevastopulo, “State
department funding to take a hit from Trump cuts,” Financial Times, May 23, 2017, available from https://www.ft.com/
content/20a4d298-3fd4-11e7-9d56-25f963e998b2.
11. “FAQ,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization Strategic
Communications Centre of Excellence, n.d., available from https://
www.stratcomcoe.org/faq, accessed November 15, 2017.
12. “About Us,” Hybrid CoE: The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, n.d., available from https://
www.hybridcoe.fi/about-us/, accessed November 15, 2017.
13. “Wales Summit Declaration: Issued by the Heads of
State and Government participating in the meeting of the North
Atlantic Council in Wales,” Press Release (2014) 120, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, issued September 5, 2014 (last updated
August 30, 2018), available from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
official_texts_112964.htm, accessed November 2, 2018.
14. “Warsaw Summit Communiqué: Issued by the Heads of
State and Government participating in the meeting of the North
Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8-9 July 2016,” Press Release (2016)
100, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, issued July 9, 2016 (last
updated March 29, 2017), available from http://www.nato.int/cps/
en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm, accessed November 6, 2017.
15. Presidential Approval and Reporting of Covert Actions, 50
U.S. Code § 3093 (e) (2018), available from http://uscode.house.gov/
view.xhtml?req=(title:50%20section:3093%20edition:prelim),
accessed December 11, 2018.
16. James Periard, “Principles of Covert Action,” The Cipher
Brief, March 9, 2017, available from https://www.thecipherbrief.com/
principles-of-covert-action.

62

17. Eric Rosenbach and Aki J. Peritz, “Covert Action,” mem
orandum in Eric Rosenbach and Aki J. Peritz, Confrontation or
Collaboration? Congress and the Intelligence Community, Cambridge,
MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard
Kennedy School, July 2009, pp. 32-35, available from https://www.
belfercenter.org/publication/covert-action.
18. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-08 Interorganizational Cooperation, Washington, DC: United States Joint Chiefs
of Staff, October 12, 2016, p. E-1.
19. Image created by author.
20. Kenneth P. Vogel and Cecilia Kang, “Senators Demand
Online Ad Disclosures as Tech Lobby Mobilizes,” The New York
Times, October 19, 2017, available from https://www.nytimes.
com/2017/10/19/us/politics/facebook-google-russia-meddlingdisclosure.html.
21. Cecilia Kang, Nicholas Fandos, and Mike Isaac, “Tech
Executives Are Contrite About Election Meddling, but Make Few
Promises on Capitol Hill,” The New York Times, October 31, 2017,
available from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/31/us/politics/
facebook-twitter-google-hearings-congress.html.
22. Leonid Bershidsky, “Russian Trolls Would Love the
‘Honest Ads Act’,” Bloomberg News, October 20, 2017, available from https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-10-20/
russian-trolls-would-love-the-honest-ads-act.
23. Mark R. Warner, “Opening Statement of Vice Chairman
Warner from Senate Intel Open Hearing with Social Media Representatives,” Mark R. Warner, November 1, 2017, available from
https://www.warner.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2017/11/openingstatement-of-vice-chairman-warner-from-senate-intel-open-hearingwith-social-media-representatives.
24. Angela Moon, “Two-thirds of American adults get news
from social media: survey,” Reuters, September 8, 2017, available
from
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-internet-socialmedia/
two-thirds-of-american-adults-get-news-from-social-media-surveyidUSKCN1BJ2A8.
25. Julie Vitkovskaya, Samuel Granados, and John Muyskens,
“The Post’s new findings in Russia’s bold campaign to influence
63

the U.S. election,” The Washington Post, June 23, 2017 (updated
July 11, 2017), available from https://www.washingtonpost.com/
graphics/2017/world/national-security/russia-hacking-timeline/?utm_
term=.cf43cf3cfa7d.

64

CHAPTER 5. CREATIVELY LEVERAGING
MILITARY MIGHT
21st century strategic deterrence is still fundamentally
about influencing an actor’s decisions. It’s based on a
solid policy foundation. It’s about credible capabilities.
It’s about what the U.S. and our allies as a whole can
bring to bear in both a military and a non-military sense.1
—General C. Robert Kehler,
U.S. Strategic Command (2012)

The United States unequivocally maintains the
finest military and fighting force in the world today,
and its ability to project force globally is unmatched.
Nevertheless, in today’s complex and globally connected operating environment, it is a fallacy to think
a country’s strength, especially the United States, can
be simply measured in missiles or military might.
Russia’s gray zone campaign against the West, which
constitutes an end-around approach to traditional,
kinetically focused military operations, is a testament
to how might can be wielded in other ways. Russia’s
nimbleness in the gray zone presents myriad challenges to conventional military strategy and power,
because its activities fall just short of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Article 5 threshold
and just shy of the degree of violence required to trigger any significant action from the United Nations
(UN) Security Council.2 Thus, in calculating military
responses to Russian gray zone activities, the United
States and its allies must be calculated and careful to
avoid inadvertent escalation into a major conflict. To
respond to this complex challenge, the United States
should adaptively focus the military aspect of its
Russia strategy on:
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• Reexamining the coercion-deterrence dynamic
through the lens of deterrence by denial;
• Revitalizing NATO; and,
• Improving warfighting capability and responsiveness in Europe.
COERCION-DETERRENCE DYNAMIC—
DETERRENCE BY DENIAL
In dealing with Russia, it is critical to understand
the coercion-deterrence dynamic. Fundamentally,
deterrence involves threatening to use force in order
to dissuade an adversary from taking an unwelcome
action.3 Deterrence typically dissuades the attack by
employing either:
• Punishment: the threat of costly retaliation in
response to an attack; or
• Denial: the recognition by the enemy that winning is unlikely or the cost is too high.
The coercion-deterrence dynamic involves a fluid combination of coercing and deterring techniques against
the enemy.4 Through active deterrence measures,
one coerces the enemy to pick one of two options—
action or inaction. The former results in consequences
and the latter achieves deterrence. Interestingly, this
pigeonholes the enemy into the same vexing conundrum discussed in chapter two. In the context of this
research, the coercion-deterrence dynamic is executional in nature and describes how best to employ the
force footprint and positioning of forces to achieve
the strategic objective—thwarting Russia’s gray zone
campaign without escalation into armed conflict.
From the end of the Cold War to 2014, the United
States and its NATO allies enjoyed a peace dividend
in Europe and practiced deterrence by punishment
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vis-à-vis Russia. The concept of punishment, however,
does not work well when dealing with a Russia who
actively exploits the gray zone in order to undermine
the international order while avoiding direct conflict
with NATO. Conversely, the United States must lead
an effort that embraces a strategy of deterrence by
denial if it wants to maintain the international order
that brought much of the world peace and prosperity.
A denial strategy is the best way for the Alliance to
signal its superior strength to Russia. Lieutenant General Frederick Ben Hodges, the U.S. Army’s former
top general in Europe, affirmed that Russia only
understands and responds to one thing—strength and
power.5
Deterrence by punishment is no longer an effective way to counter Russian military mayhem. In the
past decade alone, Russia has taken hostile actions
against three sovereign territories while sidestepping
the international law, disguising its true intentions of
expansionism by citing the protection of its Russian
“compatriots.”6 The response by NATO to all three
incidents was underwhelming, and in some cases
nonexistent. While NATO does not have a responsibility to act in the case of Ukraine because it is not a
NATO member, it still has a vital role in upholding
international law and preserving security and stability in the region. Further, part of its core responsibilities includes maintaining the appropriate level of
force and operational readiness to respond if Russia
attacks a NATO ally. In all likelihood, Russia’s gray
zone aggression and territorial expansion will continue until met with a strong NATO response. In constructing its response, NATO should rely primarily on
a strategy of deterrence by denial.
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Some might argue that such a stance is too aggressive and could spur the chance of major escalation
with Russia. Quite the opposite, NATO must act
now to remain viable, relevant, and demonstrate its
unwavering commitment to Article 5. If NATO gives
Russia the impression through lack of capability and
readiness that it does not care to uphold its promissory commitment to defend its allies, then it risks
enticing Russia “to call our bluff with catastrophic
results. Deterrence cannot be bluff; unsupported security commitments are the worst form of blunder.”7
The Russian gray zone threat is real and ever-present,
and NATO, supported by the strong leadership of the
United States, must take action now to prevent Russia
from making its next bold move.
REVITALIZING NATO
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine changed the postCold War landscape forever. Prior to this 2014 inflection point, many critics questioned the need for the
Alliance. However, today, these same critics agree that
NATO must remain a cornerstone of the U.S. military
strategy in dealing with Russia. The NATO model,
however, is dated. Formed in 1949, and built around
a conventional military paradigm, NATO is not particularly adept in responding to gray zone aggression.8
In order for NATO to remain capable of deterring the
current Russian threat, it must:
• Improve resiliency via Article 3;
• Enhance interoperability and rapid response
capability; and,
• Reexamine Article 5 procedures.
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Improve Resiliency via Article 3
In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this
Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of
continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will
maintain and develop their individual and collective
capacity to resist armed attack.9
—North Atlantic Treaty Article 3
(Washington, DC, April 4, 1949)

Critical to Article 3 is the concept of resiliency. By
meeting NATO defense spending guidelines, members
contribute to overall deterrence while solidifying their
sovereignty. Nowhere are these commitments more
important than in Europe. Of NATO’s 29 countries, 27
are European. However, despite comprising 93 percent of NATO, the vast majority of these European
countries are woefully derelict in the several dimensions of their Article 3 commitments. NATO requests
that all members commit 2 percent of their gross
domestic product (GDP) to defense and 20 percent of
their defense budget to equipment to include research
and development. Alarmingly, figure 5-1 shows that
in 2017, merely 4 countries met the guideline to spend
2 percent of their GDP on defense, 12 countries allocated 20 percent of their defense budget to equipment,
and only the United States and the United Kingdom
met both guidelines. Russia, on the other hand, spent
5.5 percent of its 2016 GDP on defense, which is higher
than all 29 NATO countries and fivefold more than 7
of them.10 The U.S. ability to deter Russia’s behavior
in the gray zone is dependent upon the unconditional
support and commitment of NATO. In order for deterrence by denial to be successful, the Alliance must
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convincingly demonstrate to Russia an overwhelming
military advantage in its near abroad.

Figure 5-1. 2017 NATO Defense Expenditures11
The lack of Europe’s fiscal commitment has directly
affected NATO’s overall readiness. For example,
during the recent Libya campaign, European countries were running out of munitions, and the Netherlands had just a 5-day supply of munitions on hand.12
Prior Defense Secretary Robert Gates, summing up the
Libya campaign, noted:
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While every Alliance member voted for the Libya mission,
less than half have participated at all, and fewer than a
third have been willing to participate in the strike mission.
Frankly, many of those allies sitting on the sidelines do so
not because they do not want to participate, but simply
because they can’t. The military capabilities simply aren’t
there.13

Further, the 27 European countries provide slightly
more than two million uniformed soldiers to the Alliance, yet only 5 percent of them are capable of deploying beyond their parent nation’s borders. When they
do deploy, there are caveats that significantly hinder
their effectiveness.14
Russia itself has nearly 3.3 million soldiers in its
active duty forces and reserves, and it has shown an
increased propensity to move those forces beyond
its borders using gray zone tactics.15 In order for the
United States to remain effective in its deterrence campaign against Russia in the gray zone, it must demand
that its European partners share the burden by meeting their Article 3 commitments—that is, by increasing defense spending in order to modernize and
better equip their defense forces. The Warsaw Summit
Communique of July 2016 signified a critical first step
toward this goal, announcing that the majority of allies
have increased military expenditures for the first time
since 2009.16 For NATO to maintain its edge over the
growing Russian threat, these trends must continue.
Enhance Interoperability and
Rapid Response Capability
Recent efforts by the United States and Germany
to modernize their partnership offer an excellent
example for other NATO members to emulate. The
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Germans have taken significant measures to enhance
interoperability with the United States to combat Russian gray zone tactics in Ukraine. Prior Defense Secretary Ash Carter, in his remarks at Atlantik Brücke
in 2015, observed three important developments in
the revitalized U.S.-German partnership. First, he
noted the establishment of the Transatlantic Capability Enhancement and Training Initiative, which better
synchronizes joint military activities, training, and
exercises between the two nations. Second, he recognized Germany’s ongoing efforts to respond to the
Russia-Ukraine crisis by providing military support.
Third, he praised Germany’s backing of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Special
Monitoring Mission to Ukraine.17 Other NATO members should follow suit, evolving to meet new and
unconventional threats such as those perpetrated by
Russia in the gray zone.
The 2014 NATO Summit in Wales marked an
important first step in improving NATO’s rapid
response capability when all participants unanimously voted to create a European-led, interoperable Very High Readiness Joint Task Force under the
NATO Response Force command structure. The joint
task force comprises a multinational brigade made up
of 5,000 troops and is capable of deploying rapidly to
respond to crises or conflicts in the region. Uniquely,
it has no permanent base or a specific location, and
the national leadership and units rotate on an annual
basis. The United Kingdom, for example, led the 2017
task force. Unfortunately, however, the Very High
Readiness Joint Task Force is not yet operating on all
cylinders; framework difficulties, susceptibilities, and
coordination issues have impeded progress to date.18
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While the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force
has had its challenges, it is still an important step in the
right direction to increase readiness. Other measures
in the last few years, such as increasing the number
of military exercises, establishing new command centers, and reorganizing its response force, demonstrate
NATO’s awareness of the Russian threat and validate
its desire to contest it. In improving upon this effort,
the United States must pressure NATO members to
modernize their forces to support enhanced interoperability and rapid response capabilities.
Reexamine Article 5 Procedures
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or
more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they
agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them,
in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United
Nations [UN], will assist the Party or Parties so attacked
by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the
other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including
the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.19
—North Atlantic Treaty Article 5
(Washington, DC, April 4, 1949)

Recognizing the enormous threat that Russia’s
“short-of-war” gray zone actions pose to international
security and stability in the region, NATO should
conduct a comprehensive review of its Article 5 procedures and responsibilities to determine if its trigger
threshold is appropriately set. Only once in its history,
following the terrorist attacks conducted against the
United States on 9/11, has NATO invoked Article 5.
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It is clear that if Russian forces attack a NATO
member through conventional military means, then
NATO would respond by invoking Article 5. What is
unclear, on the other hand, is how NATO responds
when the Russians employ hybrid warfare tactics
in the gray zone against its members. The Estonians
experienced this ambiguity firsthand in April 2007
when the Russians conducted a hybrid warfare campaign against them in retaliation for the movement of a
World War II Red Army monument in Tallinn. Russia
unleashed a fake news campaign, which encouraged
Russian-speaking Estonians to take to the streets in
violent protest; these protests quickly turned into riots
resulting in 1 death, 156 injuries, and 1,000 arrests.20
The Russians then conducted a series of cyberattacks
against the Estonian Government and its private
sector, crippling essential services for weeks and creating further havoc. NATO, however, did not respond
in any significant manner to these attacks, ultimately
enticing the Russians to continue operations in the
gray zone.
The Alliance made its first attempt to address
the gray zone issue during the Wales Summit when
it declared that a significant cyberattack on one of its
members could lead to the invocation of Article 5.21 By
ambiguously stating this declaration, NATO left itself
plenty of wiggle room to justify inaction. Moreover,
the deterrence value of this declaration is weak, as evidenced by Russia’s repeated attempts to interfere in
European elections and the 2017 hacking of the personal cell phones of NATO troops in Eastern Europe.22
In light of these events, NATO should further refine its
definition of an attack by including all forms of hybrid
warfare that threaten the sovereignty or national security of its members.
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IMPROVING WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY
IN EUROPE
The United States must strengthen its conventional
force footprint and strategic posture in Europe in
order for deterrence by denial to be effective. In doing
so, policymakers should consider actions that deter
Russia by increasing conventional forces in Eastern
Europe, address the anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)
problem posed by the Kaliningrad Oblast, and hinder
the Russian military’s freedom of maneuver.
Outnumbered and Outgunned
In 2016, the RAND Corporation war-gamed a Russian invasion of the Baltic States—the results were
troubling, to say the least. The study revealed that the
Russians could easily overrun one or more of the Baltic
nations in 60 hours or less. If the Russians choose this
route, it will leave NATO with only a few undesirable
options.23 The study, however, concluded prior to the
establishment of NATO’s enhanced forward presence (EFP) in the Baltic States and Poland (see figure
5-2). Each of the EFP’s multinational battlegroups is
equivalent to a reinforced battalion and includes 1,100
troops; importantly, they also represent all three of
NATO’s nuclear-capable members, namely the United
States, United Kingdom, and France. While these units
would not significantly alter battlefield results, they
do force the Russians to revisit their strategic risk calculations for recapturing former Soviet-occupied territories. Still, NATO needs additional conventional
forces in Europe if it expects its deterrence strategy to
work.
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Source: NATO.

Figure 5-2. EFP: Effective Deterrence or Merely a
Speed Bump for Russian Forces?24
In order for NATO to defend itself, RAND recommends a force of seven brigades, at least three of
which are heavy armored and supported by air and
indirect fires, positioned in the Baltics and immediately ready to fight.25 In the opinion of this research
team, seven brigades are the bare minimum required
to deter Russia by denial; therefore, NATO should
consider even more forces.
The Kaliningrad Oblast, a strategic enclave of Russian territory nestled between Poland and Lithuania
on the Baltic Coast, poses a serious A2/AD challenge
to effective deterrence strategy. Notwithstanding its
nuclear capability, it provides the Russians with an
ability to threaten NATO access to the Baltic Sea and
the surrounding airspace with long-range anti-ship,
surface-to-air, and surface-to-surface missiles. In order
to undercut Russia’s geostrategic advantage, NATO
must invest in state-of-the-art weapons and aircraft
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that can preemptively strike or defend against these
systems, including long-range precision fires, missile
defense, and fifth generation fighter aircraft.
As always, the United States must take the lead in
force buildup, and already has demonstrated its commitment by increasing its spending from $789 million
in 2016, to $4.8 billion in 2018, and expanding its footprint in Eastern Europe via the deployment of rotational armored and aviation brigades. This increased
footprint includes prepositioned warfighting gear
and equipment, as well as a sizable pot of money to
amplify training and multinational exercises.26 Still,
these forces represent only a fraction of those that
existed at the end of the Cold War when the United
States had 350,000 troops in Europe to counter the
Soviet threat. Because reverting to that troop level
is not feasible today, policymakers should consider
other measures to signal NATO’s resolve. Some of
these measures include:
• Concentrating additional forces in Eastern and
Central Europe, where NATO is most vulnerable, and Russia’s expansionism is most likely;
• Investing in state-of-the-art weapons systems to
offset A2/AD capabilities, including long-range
precision fires, missile defense, and fifth-generation fighter aircraft;
• Conducting widespread joint training exercises
with NATO allies and NATO partner nations;
• Increasing funding for Operation ATLANTIC
RESOLVE and the U.S. military effort to build
rotational forces in Europe specifically to deter
Russian aggression;
• Conducting frequent aerial reconnaissance
flights near the Russian border;
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• Conducting more freedom of navigation operations in the Baltic and Black Seas;
• Increasing the frequency of amphibious ready
groups and carrier strike groups operating in
the Baltic Sea;
• Reversing the trend of declining operating bases
and installations—currently, the United States
is on pace to have only 17 main operating bases
in Europe, and the total number of U.S. installations have declined by several hundred percent
since the Cold War;27
• Improving overseas basing options and creating more distributed logistical support to support interoperability;28 and,
• Enhancing, collecting, and sharing vital intelligence to anticipate Russia’s next move.
Some argue that building and positioning forces
lead to a greater chance of inadvertent escalation by
either bumping into Russian forces or through the
co-occupation of shared spaces. While this is certainly
true in some regards, the United States and NATO can
mitigate escalation by engaging in open and explicit
dialogue with Russia that clearly outlines and broadcasts the Alliance’s actions and intentions. Force
buildup and strategic positioning have three profound
and dissuading psychological effects on the enemy:
• Signals overtly to Russia, through action, that
the United States and NATO mean business visà-vis their Article 5 commitments to their allies;
• Encumbers Russia’s freedom of movement into
surrounding territories and undermines its
“near-abroad” and regional dominance goals;
and,
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• Invokes apprehension in Russia by playing
upon its fear of meeting the United States and
NATO in conventional military conflict.
Restricting Russia’s Freedom of Maneuver
The United States should lead a NATO effort to
restrict Russia’s ability to operate in the contested
areas of Georgia and Ukraine and protect the former
Soviet-occupied areas of Eastern Europe where the
threat is most prevalent. One method toward realizing this goal is to increase NATO’s regional footprint
through indigenous forces—that is, to train, equip,
and empower partner nations’ military, paramilitary,
and localized forces.29 In the past, U.S.-sponsored
indigenous force generation has proved effective in
Latin America and most famously in Afghanistan
against the Soviets during the 1980s. Specifically,
with respect to Russia, these forces could wage proxy
wars that harass Russian forces, inflict casualties, and
undermine its political will to sustain the occupation.
The National Guard’s State Partnership Program is
another initiative policymakers should consider leveraging to bolster these efforts. The program is a U.S. theater security cooperation that links a state’s National
Guard with partner nations’ military and security
forces. Since the program already maintains relationships with many of the NATO and NATO partner
militaries along the Russian border, the United States
could use it to cultivate enduring personal and institutional relationships that enhance U.S. access, presence, and influence in the near abroad region. Figure
5-3 shows the far-reaching span of this program and
therefore the opportunity it presents the United States
to help offset Russian influence in the region.
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Figure 5-3. State Partnership Program Participants
and the Year Established30
Additionally, U.S. Special Forces should openly
support defensive irregular warfare efforts by the
host nations in NATO’s Eastern European countries.
Specifically, these efforts should aim to both train and
prepare host nation forces for potential Russian occupation. By conducting this mission overtly, the United
States would be sending Russia a clear message that
occupation would come with a significant cost.
Lastly, in restricting Russia’s freedom of maneuver, policymakers should consider implementing the
concept of A2/AD. Traditionally, the Alliance has
viewed A2/AD techniques as an adversary’s capability only, but perhaps NATO could embrace a similar posture where Russia outguns it on the eastern
edge of the Alliance. Specifically, NATO could assist
a country such as Ukraine in creating organic A2/AD
or “no-go zones to restrict Russian freedom of maneuver in strategically and operationally important areas,
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such as Kiev or in the region around the port city of
Mariupol.”31 Additionally, the United States and
NATO should concentrate this footprint in areas outside of Ukraine vulnerable to Russian aggression, such
as Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia.
CONCLUSION
The United States, in close concert with NATO,
must leverage its conventional military might in creative and vigilant ways to keep Russia’s gray zone
activities at bay. By presenting a constantly changing
operational picture, the United States and NATO will
ultimately gain the upper hand while forcing Russia
to revisit its assumptions, risk calculus, and operational plans.32 By revitalizing NATO and improving
warfighting capability throughout Europe, the United
States will be better equipped to deter Russia via a
strong denial strategy.
Military Policy Recommendations
• Build a strategy based on deterrence by denial.
• Compel NATO partners to meet Article 3 guidelines to modernize their forces.
• Improve NATO rapid response capability.
• Reexamine Article 5 to address hybrid warfare
and gray zone tactics.
• Expand the EFP to at least seven brigades.
• Invest in state-of-the-art weapons and aircraft
to counter the Kaliningrad A2/AD threat.
• Increase the U.S. military footprint in Europe.
• Increase Alliance presence in the waters and
airspace around Russia.
• Maintain bases and installations to support
logistics.
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• Develop regional indigenous capacity.
• Explore friendly A2/AD capabilities.
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CHAPTER 6. MASTERING THE ART OF
ECONOMIC STATECRAFT
Despite having the most powerful economy on earth, the
U.S. too often reaches for the gun instead of the purse in
its international conduct.1
—Dr. Robert D. Blackwill, U.S. Diplomat

The United States owns the largest and most powerful economy in the world (see figure 6-1). In 2016,
the U.S. economy represented 24 percent of the global
output with a nominal gross domestic product (GDP)
of over $18.6 trillion. China, its main economic rival,
boasted the second largest economy with an $11.2 trillion nominal GDP. Compared to other leading nations
ranked 3 to 10 on the world’s biggest economies list,
the U.S. economy is larger than all of them combined,
as depicted in figure 6-1.

Figure 6-1. World’s Biggest Economies
(nominal GDP)2
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Russia’s economy, on the other hand, is not in the
top 10 and only accounts for 1.7 percent of the world’s
economy.3 Although its economy is relatively weak at
face value, Russia has cunningly found ways to wreak
considerable economic havoc on the most critical allies
of the United States.
The United States has a myopic, military-centric approach to national security that often ignores
the power of economic statecraft and the associated
tools available to it for advancing its strategic objectives. In the modern gray zone environment, Russia
has emerged as an expert in waging warfare in the
economic space. Specifically, Russia engages in illicit
trade practices, wields energy as a weapon, and provides aid to turbulent countries to advance its geopolitical interests. To counter these and other Russian
tactics, the United States must implement an economic
dimension to its gray zone strategy that considers the
full gamut of options to target Russia’s wealth and
prosperity.4 In developing the economic component
of U.S. strategy, policymakers should primarily focus
on four key areas: trade, foreign aid, sanctions, and
energy.
TRADE POLICY
The United States must develop trade policies that
not only increase its economic power at home but
also advance its national security objectives abroad.
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has
largely viewed its trade agreements through an economic lens while ignoring their use as a geopolitical
tool.5 In today’s geopolitical landscape, this stovepiped approach to economic policy is problematic and
allows adversary nations such as Russia to wage economic warfare without due consequences.
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Russia is employing its economic tools to recreate Soviet spheres of influence in Eastern Europe,
including insulating itself through the establishment
of the Eurasian Economic Union to ward off European threats. Formed on January 1, 2015, the union
is a bilateral trade union that includes Russia and the
former Soviet states of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
and Kyrgyzstan.6 Although the Eurasian Economic
Union is officially an economic union, the Russians
use it as a geopolitical tool to strengthen their influence in the region while “preventing former Soviet-bloc nations from integrating with the West.”7 In
addition to the Eurasian Economic Union, the Russians routinely use economic coercion to apply political pressure on neighboring states. For example, in
2009, Russia shut off natural gas supplies to Europe
in the height of winter following a price dispute with
Ukraine.8 In 2013, Russia banned imports of Moldovan
wine in retaliation for Moldova’s efforts to develop a
closer relationship with the European Union (EU).9 In
2014, Russia banned imports of Polish fruit and vegetables following Warsaw’s support of U.S.-EU sanctions.10 Notably, these are only a few examples of how
Russia harnesses economic power to punish former
Soviet-bloc nations that do not conform to its policies
or choose to build closer ties with the EU.11
The United States, in response, must construct a
European trade agreement that not only increases
the economic power of the United States and its allies
but also advances U.S.-EU national security interests.
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(T-TIP) proposal is the perfect vehicle to achieve both
of these objectives. The T-TIP is a proposed bilateral trade agreement between the United States and
the EU that, if completed, would be the largest free
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trade agreement on the globe. Currently, the U.S. and
EU trade amount is approximately $1 trillion, which
accounts for 30 percent of global merchandise trade,
40 percent of world trade in services, and nearly half
of global GDP.12 By eliminating tariffs and trade barriers, the T-TIP would increase U.S. exports by $124
billion while adding an estimated $223 billion to the
global economy by 2025.13
In addition to enhancing both the U.S. and EU
economies and strengthening their partnership, the
T-TIP could serve as a powerful geopolitical instrument by isolating and weakening the Russian economy. In order to maximize the T-TIP’s impact on
Russia and advance its national security objectives,
the United States should incorporate additional provisions including:
• Joint responses to Russian economic coercion
and global market abuses;
• Reapplication of the most effective elements of
current U.S.-EU sanctions;
• An energy chapter that outlines preemptive
safeguards and responses to future attempts at
pipeline politics; and,
• A plan to reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian oil and natural gas by increasing exports of
U.S. oil and natural gas to Europe.14
FOREIGN AID
Foreign aid is a simple yet effective tool of economic statecraft. It comes in many forms such as Official Development Assistance (ODA), bank loans, or
military financing. ODA is the most common form of
aid and aims to stimulate the economic development
and welfare of developing countries. ODA funding
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comes from myriad bilateral or multilateral channels,
including global organizations like the United Nations
(UN) or World Bank.15
Foreign aid has many desirable effects; it can motivate the recipient to change its current economic practices, reduce corruption, and behave more responsibly.
Further, rescinding or threatening to terminate aid can
also compel a nation to modify its behavior, especially
when it is in dire need of financial assistance.16 Gray
zone actors such as Russia often use a combination of
both approaches to manipulate and take advantage of
developing nations by coercing them to align with its
geopolitical interests.
Despite its sputtering economy, Russia has significantly increased its foreign aid program over the
past 5 years (see figure 6-2). In 2012, Russia spent $465
million on ODA programs. In 2016, Russia spent $1.26
billion, an increase of 170 percent. Likewise, Russia’s
ratio of ODA as a share of gross national income (GNI)
also rose during this period from 0.024 percent in 2012
to 0.08 percent in 2016.17
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Figure 6-2. Russian Official Development Aid
Expenditures (2012-2016)18
Russia’s motivation for assistance is almost certainly self-serving and not altruistic. Alarmingly, many
of the recipients of its funding are major adversaries
of the United States, including North Korea, Iran, and
Syria. In its near abroad, Russia also uses foreign aid
to maintain influence over former Soviet-bloc states
and prevent them from aligning with the West. Most
recently, in November 2017, Russia approved financial loans and energy deals to bailout another U.S.
adversary, Venezuela. By restructuring Venezuela’s
$3.5 billion debt, Russia prevented the collapse of Venezuela’s Government, reinforced a strategic alliance,
and asserted its future influence in South America.19
The United States must invigorate and revamp its
foreign aid program to complement its national security interests, especially concerning Russia. Although
the United States is the most generous regarding net
ODA, its foreign assistance as a percentage of GNI
ranks near the bottom of Organization for Economic
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Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries (see
figure 6-3). In 2015, the U.S. ratio of ODA as a share of
its GNI was a mere 0.17 percent, which is extremely
low when compared to the OECD country average of
0.41 percent and the UN target of 0.7 percent. If the
United States fails to assist states in need, it can expect
that the Russians will step in to fill this void while
simultaneously exerting their geopolitical influence
over them. As a first step toward refining its foreign
aid program, the United States should increase ODA
spending to at least 0.7 percent of GNI to meet the UN
target.

Figure 6-3. ODA as a Percentage of GNI (2015)20
Coupled with increasing foreign aid funding, the
United States should incentivize aid by offering more
of it to countries that are willing to build closer ties to
the West and resist Russian pressure. In overhauling
the U.S. financial aid program, policymakers should:
• Restore the Department of State and Foreign
Aid budgets to pre-2018 President’s Budget
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proposal levels (reduced by approximately 40
percent);
• Increase ODA foreign aid funding from 0.17
percent to at least 0.7 percent of GNI; and,
• Increase aid to Eastern European countries to
bolster their economies and make them less susceptible to Russian influence.
ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SANCTIONS
One economic tool the United States uses liberally
is economic sanctions, which have proven effective
in punishing the economies of some hostile regimes.
Economic sanctions are restrictions on trade and
financial actions for geopolitical purposes that, when
applied effectively, can impose a significant cost on
the target country. If the costs are high enough, the
targeted country might change its behavior or modify
its policies.21
When it comes to imposing sanctions, the United
States enjoys a comparative advantage over the rest of
the world due to its predominant role in global banking and financial institutions. The U.S. economy is the
backbone of the global financial system with more
than 80 percent of all financial transactions worldwide
using the dollar.22 Further, 64 percent of the world’s
currency reserves are in dollars.23 Collectively, the
global reliance on the dollar puts the United States in
a unique position to impose powerful financial sanctions on other nations when necessary.24 Financial
sanctions include the freezing of assets, restrictions
on doing business with targeted individuals or companies, and investment moratoriums on sanctioned
regimes. In addition, the United States can employ
secondary sanctions against countries choosing to do
business with institutions from the targeted state.25
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On August 2, 2017, President Trump signed into
law the Countering America’s Adversaries through
Sanctions Act. The act imposes new economic sanctions on several adversary countries including Iran,
North Korea, and Russia.26 With respect to Russia,
these new sanctions are in addition to existing sanctions that the United States imposed in 2014 following
Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The new legislation
tightens current measures while expanding restrictions in trade and finance. The 2018 Estonian Foreign
Intelligence Service Report forecasts that these collective sanctions will slash Russia’s economic growth by
at least 1 percent this year alone.27
Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions
Act. . . . provides sanctions for activities concerning:
(1) cyber security, (2) crude oil projects, (3) financial
institutions, (4) corruption, (5) human rights abuses,
(6) evasion of sanctions, (7) transactions with Russian
defense or intelligence sectors, (8) export pipelines,
(9) privatization of state-owned assets by government
officials, and (10) arms transfers to Syria [emphasis in
original].28

While sanctions have hurt Russia’s economy, they
also have had a huge impact on European economies.
Despite the EU’s support for multilateral sanctions
against Russia in 2014, it lost an estimated 100 billion
euros due to their interdependence on Russia’s economy. In contrast, the costs to the U.S. economy were
minimal since U.S. trade with Russia is so restricted
and limited. In August 2017, the United States
announced its new sanctions bill; however, it failed to
consult its European allies and consider implications
to their economies. As a result, many EU leaders were
hesitant to support it and vocally opposed the bill due
to its potential for damage to Europe’s energy market.
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European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker
summed up many EU leaders’ frustrations when he
stated, “‘America First’ cannot mean that Europe’s
interests come last.”29 In sidestepping the EU, the
United States created unnecessary transatlantic friction with its most critical partners. Moreover, this friction is currently playing into the hands of Russia, who
wants nothing more than to see a wedge between the
United States and the EU, especially if it will undermine the effects of imposed sanctions.30 Consequently,
the United States must be more considerate of its
European partners and exercise some level of restraint
as it moves forward with imposing stronger trade
restrictions.
The United States must also recognize the limitations of a sanctions-first and only approach as a
primary tool of geoeconomics. Although the 2014
sanctions were harmful, they did not appear to change
Russia’s behavior in the least. Russia has become
increasingly belligerent and has shown an increased
propensity for operations in the gray zone. Ironically,
the 2014 sanctions may have created a “rally around
the flag” effect, as evidenced by Putin’s all-time high
public approval rating of 89 percent later in June 2015.
Instead of coming under personal fire for the subpar
Russian economy, Putin was able to shift blame to
the United States and the West for Russia’s economic
hardships. Therefore, many critics argue that these
sanctions empowered Putin as many Russian citizens
admired his ability to stand up to the West.31 Although
this attitude may not last in the long-term, U.S. policymakers must still be cognizant of unintended consequences when treating Russian gray zone behavior
with economic sanctions.
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Although the overall utility of trade restrictions
is debatable, most agree the United States possesses
the unilateral ability to unleash powerful financial
sanctions on Russia. Some of these measures include
targeting financial institutions, oligarchs, and government officials involved in corruption. To date,
however, the use of financial tools has been significantly underutilized. As summarized in the March
2017 Senate Armed Services Committee’s hearing on
emerging Russian threats:
The United States has only applied full blocking sanctions
on one Russian bank, and that bank is not even among
the 20 largest Russian financial institutions. Furthermore,
personal sanctions against corrupt individuals such as
those mandated by the Magnitsky Act have barely been
utilized at all, with less than 30 individuals designated
since 2012.32

Moving forward, the United States needs to
unleash some of these powerful financial sanction
tools. In formulating economic and financial sanctions,
U.S. policymakers should:
• Continue 2014 and 2017 sanctions in force;
• Employ additional multilateral sanctions in
close coordination with the EU;
• Continue to restrict or limit access to U.S.
markets;
• Target Russian banks and financial institutions;
and,
• Target Russian elites and oligarchs by freezing
their assets and destroying their wealth.
SHAPING THE NEW ENERGY LANDSCAPE
Any economic strategy employed against the
Russians must include a plan to target Moscow’s
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primary source of economic power—its energy sector.
Energy is the largest sector in the Russian economy
and accounts for more than 25 percent of its GDP.
Moreover, energy exports account for 68 percent of
all Russian trade, and the resulting revenues constitute half of the Russian Government’s budget. From
a geoeconomics perspective, Russia is adroit in using
its vast energy resources to advance its national security objectives. Using energy as a strategic weapon,
it employs coercive natural gas policies on its near
abroad to assert influence over neighboring countries
while preventing them from siding with the West.
Russia’s monopoly of natural gas in the region
enables it to leverage a powerful economic advantage over Europe. Overall, Russian exports account
for a third of all gas consumed in Europe, although
some countries rely on Moscow for nearly all of their
requirements (see figure 6-4).33 Possessing this advantage, Russia regularly threatens to withhold natural
gas exports to exert influence over dependent countries throughout Europe. While Europe can access outside suppliers to mitigate these disruptions, it is costly,
and Europe is still ultimately dependent on Russia for
its gas supplies. With no alternative energy sources,
these countries are vulnerable to Russian coercion.
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Figure 6-4. Natural Gas Supplied by Russia to
European Countries, Percent of Total (2012)34
To minimize Europe’s exposure to Russian coercion, the United States and its allies must find ways
to reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian energy by
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diversifying their gas supplies. One strategy might
involve the U.S. Government creating incentives for
the private sector to ship liquefied natural gas (LNG)
to Europe. Although industry experts agree that such
initiatives will not totally displace Russia as Europe’s
top gas supplier, the United States can at least disrupt
Russia’s energy sector by capturing between 12 and 19
percent of the European market by 2020.35
Once reliant upon foreign energy, the United
States is now the world’s top producer of oil and gas
consequent to its discovery of hydraulic fracking.36
Between 2006 and 2013, fracking boosted the amount
of recoverable gas in the United States by 680 percent.37
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA),
the U.S. production of natural gas will reach 31.4 trillion cubic feet (tcf) by 2022 with over half of that production available for LNG export, placing the United
States near the top among global LNG exporters (see
figure 6-5). In addition, there are currently three major
LNG terminals under construction in Texas, which
will bring the U.S. total export platforms to six.38 By
seizing the opportunity to ship natural gas across the
Atlantic, the United States will help diversify the EU’s
energy supplies and reduce Europe’s dependence
on Russian gas. In turn, this will drive down energy
prices, thereby yielding a crippling effect on Russia’s
fragile economy and diminishing its ability to exert
influence in the region.
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Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration.

Figure 6-5. U.S. Natural Gas Production Projections
by Source (1990-2040)39
The United States should also encourage its European allies to drill for shale gas of their own. According to the IEA, “Europe, including Ukraine but not
Russia, holds 598 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of shale gas,
or 8.3 percent of the global shale gas reserves.”40 If all
European countries invest in fracking technology, the
IEA estimates that they could produce 0.4 tcf a year of
unconventional gas by 2020 and 2.8 tcf by 2035, which
constitutes almost half the amount of gas Europe
imported from Russia in 2012.41
Europe, however, has been mostly resistant to
fracking and hampered by strict governmental regulations and environmental concerns. Currently, France,
Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Bulgaria,
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Ireland, and the Czech Republic have banned fracking
completely.42 In order to reduce European dependence
on Russian gas, the United States must persuade its
European allies that the economic and security benefits of fracking outweigh the costs of Russian control
over the energy market.
Finally, the United States must partner with the
EU to develop an energy security strategy. The strategy should include a regulatory plan that punishes
Russian energy firms for intentionally engaging in
anti-competitive practices such as charging unfair
prices and blocking cross-border gas trade. The United
States should also join forces with the EU to encourage investment in new gas pipelines that can serve as
alternatives to Russian-controlled infrastructure.43
In shaping the new energy landscape and reducing
Europe’s dependence on Russian gas supplies, U.S.
policymakers should:
• Create incentives for the American private
sector to ship LNG to Europe;
• Encourage European allies to drill for shale gas
of their own; and,
• Collaborate with their EU counterparts to
develop an energy security strategy.
CONCLUSION
Russia is an expert at exploiting the economic space
to exert geopolitical influence over its competitors.
As part of its overall strategy, the United States must
embrace the full spectrum of the economic instrument
to include the use of trade, foreign aid, sanctions, and
energy to advance its national security objectives and
limit Russia’s sphere of influence in the gray zone.
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Economic Policy Recommendations
Complete T-TIP with Additional Provisions
• Joint responses to Russian economic coercion
and global market abuses;
• Reapplication of the most effective elements of
current U.S.-EU sanctions;
• An energy chapter that outlines preemptive
safeguards and responses to future attempts at
pipeline politics; and,
• A plan to reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian oil and natural gas by increasing exports of
U.S. oil and natural gas to Europe.
Overhaul the U.S. Foreign Aid Program
• Restoring the Department of State and foreign
aid budgets to pre-2018 President’s Budget proposal levels;
• Increasing ODA foreign aid funding from 0.17
percent to at least 0.7 percent of GNI; and,
• Increasing aid to Eastern European countries in
order to bolster their economies and make them
less susceptible to Russian influence.
Formulate Economic and Financial Sanctions
• Continuing 2014 and 2017 sanctions in force;
• Employing additional multilateral sanctions in
close coordination with the EU;
• Restricting or limiting access to U.S. markets;
• Targeting Russian banks and financial institutions; and,
• Targeting Russian elites and oligarchs by freezing their assets and destroying their wealth.
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Reduce Europe’s Dependence on Russian Gas Supplies
• Creating incentives for the American private
sector to ship LNG to Europe;
• Encouraging European allies to drill for shale
gas of their own; and,
• Collaborating with their EU counterparts to
develop an energy security strategy.
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CHAPTER 7. U.S. GRAY ZONE POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS
While still maintaining overall military superiority over its adversaries, the United States must update
its strategic framework to simultaneously deal with
newer, unconventional threats such as modern gray
zone warfare. The lack of a cohesive strategy to date
has enabled less powerful countries such as Russia to
gain strength and gradually chip away at the credibility and influence of the United States and its allies.
In deterring Russia in the gray zone, the United
States must shift its strategic focus from a military-centric model to one that comprises a whole-of-government approach employing all instruments of national
power. The diplomacy, information, military, and economic (DIME) model provides the necessary framework for U.S. policymakers to begin to piece together
a comprehensive strategy that targets Russian aggression without immediately resorting to major escalation or conflict.
Working as an interdependent system, each lever
of DIME represents an instrument of national power
that, when operated at varying degrees of intensity
and in tandem with the other instruments, provides
an all-encompassing, holistic method for dealing
with Russia in the gray zone. While this monograph
offers only a starting point for developing this deterrence strategy, it represents an important foundation
that U.S. policymakers can build upon and eventually
implement more permanently in the form of a classified U.S. Presidential Executive order.
In building a gray zone deterrence strategy, U.S.
policymakers should consider the following recommendations across the DIME framework.
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DIPLOMACY RECOMMENDATIONS
• Reset U.S.-Russia diplomatic staffing to pre2016 sanction levels;
• Promote cooperation and diplomatic engagement via the NATO-Russia Council (NRC)
and other North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) forums;
• Renew the U.S.-Russia military-to-military relationship and lift National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) restrictions;
• Explore opportunities for cybersecurity initiatives with Russia;
• Collaborate with Russia on a short- and longterm strategy in Syria;
• Work together to pursue global nonproliferation and nuclear security initiatives;
• Negotiate a 5-year extension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START); and,
• Continue cooperation in multinational space
exploration efforts.
INFORMATION RECOMMENDATIONS
• Establish an Office of Foreign Influence (OFI) to
detect and monitor gray zone activity;
• Draft congressional legislation to combat online
misinformation and propaganda, restrict the
use of foreign-generated bots and trolls, and
build transparency in online political ads;
• Build resiliency via Presidential actions that
denounce Russian activities publicly;
• Fully resource and fund the Global Engagement
Center (GEC) to enable partners to counter propaganda and misinformation;
• Support NATO and European initiatives,
including counter-hybrid warfare operations
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and strategic communications and messaging;
and,
• Employ covert action to undercut Russia’s
active measures, expose human rights violations, delegitimize the Russian Government,
and embarrass Putin and his inner circle.
MILITARY RECOMMENDATIONS
• Build a strategy based on deterrence by denial;
• Compel NATO partners to meet Article 3 guidelines to modernize their forces;
• Improve NATO rapid response capability;
• Reexamine Article 5 to address hybrid warfare
and gray zone tactics;
• Expand the enhanced forward presence (EFP)
to at least seven brigades;
• Invest in state-of-the-art weapons and aircraft
to counter Kaliningrad anti-access/area denial
(A2/AD) threat;
• Increase the U.S. military footprint in Europe;
• Increase Alliance presence in the waters and
airspace around Russia;
• Maintain bases and installations to support
logistics;
• Develop regional indigenous capacity; and,
• Explore friendly A2/AD capabilities.
ECONOMIC RECOMMENDATIONS
• Complete Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (T-TIP) with additional provisions,
including:
• Joint responses to Russian economic coercion and global market abuses;
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• Reapplication of the most effective elements of current U.S.-European Union (EU)
sanctions;
• An energy chapter that outlines preemptive
safeguards and responses to future attempts
at pipeline politics; and,
• A plan to reduce Europe’s dependence on
Russian oil and natural gas by increasing
exports of U.S. oil and natural gas to Europe.
• Overhaul the U.S. foreign aid program by:
• Restoring the Department of State and foreign aid budgets to pre-2018 President’s
budget proposal levels;
• Increasing Official Development Assistance
(ODA) foreign aid funding from 0.17 percent to at least 0.7 percent of gross national
income (GNI); and,
• Increasing aid to Eastern European countries
in order to bolster their economies and make
them less susceptible to Russian influence.
• Formulate economic and financial sanctions by:
• Continuing 2014 and 2017 sanctions in force;
• Employing additional multilateral sanctions
in close coordination with the EU;
• Restricting or limiting access to U.S. markets;
• Targeting Russian banks and financial institutions; and,
• Targeting Russian elites and oligarchs by
freezing their assets and destroying their
wealth.
• Reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian gas
supplies by:
• Creating incentives for the American private
sector to ship liquefied natural gas (LNG) to
Europe;
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• Encouraging European allies to drill for shale
gas of their own; and,
• Collaborating with their EU counterparts to
develop an energy security strategy.
See table 7-1 for an overview of the strategic policy
options for using the instruments of national power.
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Table 7-1. Employing the Instruments of
National Power
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Information

• Establish an OFI:
o Build a dedicated team to detect and
monitor gray zone activity in U.S. media and social media.
• Draft congressional legislation:
o Combat online misinformation and
propaganda;
o Restrict use of foreign-generated bots
and trolls; and,
o Build transparency in online political
ads.
• Build resiliency via Presidential actions:
o Denounce Russian activities publicly.
• Fully resource and fund the Department
of State and the GEC:
o Enable partners to counter propaganda and misinformation.
• Support NATO and European initiatives:
o Counter-hybrid warfare operations;
and,
o Strategic communications and messaging.
• Employ covert action:
o Undercut Russia’s active measures;
o Expose human rights violations;
o Delegitimize Russian Government;
and,
o Embarrass Putin and his inner circle.

Diplomatic

• Employ a common ground
approach to diplomacy:
o Reopen lines of communication and bring both
parties to the table;
o Negotiate to build trust and
confidence; and,
o Set precedence to establish gray zone rules.
• Recognize that going back to
a pre-2014 level of cooperation is unrealistic:
o Changes in the NATO-Russian relations following
Ukraine invasion.
• Embrace U.S.-Russia mutual
interests:
o Diplomatic staffing levels;
o Promote cooperation via
the NATO Russia Council;
o Military-to-military cooperation;
o Cybersecurity;
o Stability in Syria;
o Nonproliferation and nuclear security;
o Arms control; and,
o Space exploration.

Economic
• Complete T-TIP with additional provisions:
o Respond to Russian economic coercion
and global market abuses;
o Reapply the most effective elements of
current U.S.-EU sanctions;
o Include energy chapter that outlines preemptive safeguards and responses; and,
o Introduce plan to reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian energy.
• Foreign aid:
o Restore the Department of State and foreign aid budgets to pre-2018 levels;
o Increase ODA foreign aid funding from
0.17 percent to at least 0.7 percent of
GNI; and,
o Increase aid to Eastern European countries.
• Sanctions:
o Continue 2014 and 2017 sanctions;
o Employ additional multilateral sanctions
with EU;
o Restrict or limit access to U.S. markets;
o Target Russian banks and financial institutions; and,
o Target Russian elites and oligarchs.
• Reduce Europe’s reliance on Russian energy:
o Create incentives for private sector to ship
LNG to Europe;
o Encourage allies to drill for shale gas; and,
o Collaborate to develop an energy security
strategy.

Military
• Demonstrate superior military
power and change the deterrence
model from one of punishment to
denial.
• NATO revitalization:
o Pressure allies to meet Article 3
guidelines for defense spending;
o Enhance NATO interoperability
and rapid response capability;
and,
o Reexamine Article 5 to address
hybrid warfare and gray zone
tactics.
• Improve warfighting capability in
Europe:
o Expand the EFP to at least seven brigades;
o Invest in advanced weapons
and aircraft to counter Kaliningrad A2/AD threat;
o Increase the U.S. military footprint in Europe;
o Increase Alliance presence in
the waters and airspace around
Russia;
o Maintain bases and installations
to support logistics;
o Develop regional indigenous
capacity; and,
o Explore friendly A2/AD capabilities.
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